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Abstract
The Southeast Alaska salmon purse seine fishery (S01A) is an Alaska state waters limited entry 
fishery. When initially limited by the Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission in 1975, 419 
permanent permits were issued. As salmon prices dropped in the late 1990s, current and expected 
future revenues also dropped leading to a decline in the market value o f permit. This led permitees to 
look at different ways to improve their economic position. Reduction of permit numbers through the 
buyback and permanent retirement o f some permits emerged as a preferred option for the S01A 
fishery; it was motivated as the best means to improve economic conditions in the fishery. After a 
very long road o f regulatory changes at the state and federal level, 35 permits were bought and retired 
in 2008 using funds provided under a federal grant. A second buyback in 2012, based on a federally 
backed fishery reduction loan led to the retirement o f 65 additional permits. Basic economic 
principles suggest that resulting decrease in supply of limited entry permits would lead to an increase 
in the market value of remaining permits. An important policy question is: whether the increased 
value to permitees is sufficient to offset the cost to taxpayers of financing the buyback. However, 
conducting that cost-benefit assessment is made difficult because of unrelated but concomitant 
changes in exvessel prices and catch volumes. During the same time that permits were being 
removed through the buyback, the exvessel value o f salmon increased as did the volume of Southeast 
Alaska salmon harvests, per-vessel average exvessel gross earnings, and the market value of S01A 
permits. Econometric analyses based on Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission (CFEC) 
time series data on S01A permit values, estimated gross earnings, and salmon prices indicate that the 
buybacks led to statistically significant increases in the asset value of S01A LEPs. In light o f the 
program’s stated goals, the buyback was a qualified success in increasing the asset value of S01A 
permits and removing latent fishing capacity from returning to the fishery as exvessel prices 
increased. The buyback did not change the fundamental conditions that precondition the Alaska 
salmon LEP program to systematic vulnerabilities inherent in a management system that does not 
counter the pernicious race for fish motivations of participants.
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11.0 Introduction
The Southeast Alaska salmon purse seine fishery (S01A) was put under Limited Entry Permit (LEP) 
management by the Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission (CFEC) in 1975 with an initial 
issuance of 419 permanent LEPs. When salmon exvessel prices and revenues collapsed in the late 
1990s (Williams et al., 2009), permit values also crashed (Herrmann et al., 2004) and salmon LEP 
holders throughout Alaska began exploring regulatory changes and alternative patterns o f industrial 
organization to recoup economic value. Fishing cooperatives were explored in the Chignik, Alaska 
LEP salmon fishery from 2002 to 2005. Although the Chignik cooperative was a successful 
innovation, it was opposed by a vocal minority of permitees and was disallowed under a 2006 ruling 
by the Alaska Supreme Court, which found the cooperative structure violated Alaska Statutes 
(Knapp, 2008). Permit-stacking and dual permits were implemented in the Bristol Bay, Alaska LEP 
salmon fisheries in 2004 (AS 16.05.251).1 LEP holders in the S01A fishery were attracted to the idea 
o f a permit buyback as a means to increase economic returns to individual permitees to remedy 
economic stress brought on by low exvessel prices. Their reasoning was that a reduction in the 
number of permits fished, ceteris paribus, would lead to an increase in the average catch for the 
remaining permitees. Implementing the initial buyback program required changes to the state’s 
Limited Entry Act (AS 16.43) as well as Congressional appropriations and federal regulations. The 
initial buyback, in 2008, retired 35 permits and was funded with a federal grant. A second buyback, in 
2012, retired an additional 65 permits and was financed through a federally backed fishery reduction 
loan in 2012. This paper will explain the larger context o f limited entry in Alaska, document the 
specific history of buyback in the S01A fishery, and evaluate the buyback program in light o f its 
stated goals. Analyses are based on Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission (CFEC) time 
series data on permit value, exvessel prices, and estimated gross earnings.
Limited Entry Permit (LEP) Fishery Management Tool
Limited entry permits (LEP) are a widely used tool to restrict the number of participants in 
commercial fisheries to help avoid grounds congestion, improve management precision, and 
contribute to economic wellbeing (Crutchfield, 1979; Wilen, 1988). LEP programs range in their 
design, shape, management, scale, and motivations. Fisheries managers were often the key advocates 
for limitation to maintain management control in the face of increasing harvest capacity (Wilen, 
1988). Notably, fishery managers were the crucial advocates in many of the early implementations of
1 Permit stacking is one individual who holds and fishes two LEPs. Dual permit operations are two individuals, each who 
hold one LEP, who fish together on one vessel, and thus are allowed to increase the amount o f gear on the vessel (Shriver 
et al., 2014, p. 219).
2LEP programs in Alaska, Washington, and Australia (Wilen, 1988). Once hailed as an elegant 
economic solution to the rivalrous and nonexclusive open access fishery often referred to as the 
“tragedy o f the commons” (Hardin, 1968); evidence of the efficacy o f LEPs varies according to 
unique objectives and circumstances o f their design and implementation in particular fisheries. There 
is general agreement that they are not, by themselves, effective at preventing continued increases in 
fishing power or at preventing the dissipation of economic rent (Fraser, 1979; Wilen, 1988; Smith, 
2004; Homans and Wilen, 2005). Despite limitation, fishers still face incentives that perpetuate rent 
dissipation (Wilen, 1988; Criddle, 2012). That is, whenever fishers can increase their fishing power, 
they gain a fleeting advantage over their competitors in the LEP fishery and temporarily receive a 
larger slice o f the pie. Once the rest of the fleet adopts the new technology, any temporary gain to 
the individual is lost but average costs for all LEP operations have increased. What is rational from 
the individual’s perspective is irrational when viewed from a management or fishery perspective 
(Criddle, 2012; Criddle and Shimizu, 2014). Fraser (1979) reviewed the salmon LEP program 
implemented in British Columbia and found that much of the economic benefit was dissipated as the 
fishing fleet was consolidated from small vessels to large vessels and fishing power actually increased 
post-limitation.
Townsend (1990) reviewed thirty entry restriction programs worldwide and found several 
congruencies. First, the economic success o f a program is correlated with the level o f restrictiveness 
(Townsend, 1990). Second, successful management is inversely related to the complexity o f the 
fishery (Townsend, 1990). Third, the political and social support of the LEP program is critical for 
success. Millerd (2007) showed how early attempts at limiting entry in the British Columbia salmon 
fishery at the turn of the 20th century failed; although economically efficient, equity concerns, among 
other factors, led to a reversion to open access. Fourth, there is evidence that the rent generation 
power of LEPs is engendered through the reduction in short-run externalities, i.e., a limit to increases 
in participation as exvessel prices rise, rather than solving long-run externalities (Townsend, 1990). 
Fifth, the initial power o f an LEP program is indicative of its long-term strength (Townsend, 1990). 
That is, although politically appealing, gradual implementation of limitation programs will either 
erode benefits or stagnate as ineffective as vested interests become entrenched with the status quo. 
Sixth, when generated, LEP rent is often politically divisive (Townsend, 1990). In general, there is a 
consensus that LEP programs are one tool, in the fishery manger’s “tool box” to help control effort, 
but in of themselves, they do not ensure economic rationalization (Wilen, 1988; Townsend, 1990; 
Smith, 2004).
3Alaska Commercial Salmon Fishery
Commercial fishing for salmon in Alaska began in the 1800’s although subsistence harvest of salmon 
predates modern times (Newell, 1994; Clark et al., 2006; ADF&G, 2009). The Alaska Native salmon 
subsistence management system was an effective use of territorial use rights where clans or house 
groups excluded one another from access to salmon resources at specific locations (Rogers, 1979). 
The aboriginal management system was usurped in the late 1800’s by commercial harvesting and 
processing of salmon using canning technology and more efficient harvesting tools including fish 
traps and higher quality fiber netting (Criddle and Shimizu, 2014). Criddle and Shimizu (2014) note 
that this usurpation altered the nature of risk in the harvest strategy from a risk averse subsistence 
harvest where overharvest could mean the difference between life and death, to an aggressive harvest 
strategy meant to maximize profits. The salmon canneries, under ineffective federal management, 
utilized efficient salmon traps and monopsony control to displace Alaska Natives. Their decision to 
maximize short run profits led to overharvest o f salmon stocks and to eventual decreased salmon 
returns, and engendered resentment that motivated calls for Alaska statehood (Rogers, 1979; Criddle 
and Shimizu, 2014). Exacerbating stress to an overtaxed fishery and fuel to simmering political 
discontent, beginning in 1955, Japanese fishing vessels were allowed to intercept Alaskan salmon on 
the high seas, a political favor meant to help Japan’s post-war recovery and strengthen its allegiance 
in the cold war against Russia (ADF&G, 2009). It is perhaps unsurprising that when, in that same 
year the Alaskan Constitution was written, it included unique provisions that stipulate that the state’s 
natural endowment of resources would be reserved for the common use of the people, managed 
using the sustained yield principle, and that there will be no exclusive right o f fishery.2
Alaska became the 49th state in 1959. Immediately after statehood, the federal government 
transferred management of Alaska’s fisheries to the Alaska Department o f Fish & Game (ADF&G) 
and the Alaska Legislature banned fish traps (ADF&G, 2009). To satisfy the sustained yield principle 
enshrined in the Constitution, ADF&G’s Division of Commercial Fisheries manages the salmon 
fisheries by setting target levels o f escapements for each distinct stock. Area Management Biologists 
(AMBs) meet escapement goals by using emergency orders (EO) to open and close salmon fisheries 
and to allocate harvest opportunity between different user groups (subsistence, personal use, 
commercial, and sport). ADF&G does not recover funds to cover the cost of management from the
2 Wherever occurring in their natural state, fish, wildlife, and waters are reserved to the people for common use (Alaska 
Constitution Article VIII, Section 3). Fish, forests, wildlife, grasslands, and all other replenishable resources belonging to 
the State shall be utilized, developed, and maintained on the sustained yield principle, subject to preferences among 
beneficial uses. (Alaska Constitution Article VIII, Section 4). No exclusive right or special privilege o f fishery shall be 
created or authorized in the natural waters o f the State (Alaska Constitution Article VIII, Section 15).
4fisheries that the state manages; this leaves the department vulnerable to changes in state budget as 
the costs of management continue to increase.
Alaska’s LEP Program
Despite state control of the fishery resource, Alaska’s salmon returns continued to decline through 
the 1960s, a decline that managers attributed, in part, to continued increases in participation that 
made it difficult to monitor catch and escapement (ADF&G, 2009). To allay the effect of increased 
participation on dwindling returns, the Alaska Legislature proposed limited entry in 1962 and 1968. 
Both attempts were challenged in court and deemed to violate both the Alaska State Constitution and 
the U.S. Constitution because both attempts effectively discriminated against nonresidents (Bozanich 
v. Reetz 1969; Reetz v. Bozanich, 1970). Thus, based on the outcome of court decisions, limited 
entry was not legal without an amendment to Article VIII, section 15 o f the state’s Constitution. In 
1972, the State Constitution was amended and in 1973, the Alaska State Legislature passed the Alaska 
Limited Entry Act (AS 16.43), establishing authority to limit entry in 19 of Alaska’s salmon fisheries 
where each fishery was defined by a combination o f area, species, and gear (Shriver et al., 2014).
The Limited Entry Act established a new state agency, the CFEC (AS 16.43.030) with the authority
to “regulate entry into the commercial fisheries for all fishery resources in the state” (AS 16.43.080
(1)).3 The Act provides a process for limiting fisheries with the documented purpose:
.. .to promote the conservation and sustained yield management of Alaska’s fishery 
resource and the economic health and stability o f commercial fishing in Alaska by 
regulating and controlling entry of participants and vessels into the commercial 
fisheries in the public interest and without unjust discrimination” (AS 16.43.010(a)).
Notably absent in the Act was any reference to economic efficiency (Rogers, 1979). Adasiak (1979) 
posits that an implicit goal in the Act’s “economic health and stability” language was, “the goal of a 
professionalized, diversified fleet” and this goal was discussed during the creation of the law. Adasiak 
(1979) also notes that the Act does not control increases in effort at the individual level, but rather it 
is the regulatory authority of the Alaska Board of Fisheries and management authority o f the Alaska 
Department of Fish & Game where effort is controlled. Fundamentally, the LEP program of Alaska 
does not mitigate the incentives for individual fishermen to stay one step ahead of their competitors 
and regulatory controls by investing in marginally more powerful gear to gain a temporary financial 
advantage (Criddle, 2012; Criddle and Shimizu, 2014).
3 Note that not all fisheries within Alaska state waters are limited.
5The Act provides the framework for limiting entry and issuing LEPs4 to individuals. Issuing LEPs to 
individuals rather than vessels was a specific aspect of the program design meant to increase the 
bargaining power of fishermen in relation to processors (Adasiak, 1979). At the time o f limitation, 
the perception was that the processing sector still maintained control over fishermen through 
financing arrangements and market availability (Adasiak, 1979). To allocate the initial endowment of 
LEPs the Act mandates that the CFEC rank applicants using a priority classification system that is 
based upon the applicant’s degree of economic dependence, past participation, and the relative 
hardship they would suffer if  denied a permit (AS 16.43.250). Using these standards, the CFEC ranks 
applicants. Applicants who the CFEC ranks at or below the minor economic hardship threshold 
receive permits that are permanent but non-transferable. Non-transferable permits are cancelled 
when the permit holder dies or does not pay their annual fee for two consecutive years (A.S. 
16.43.150 (d)). Applicants who the CFEC ranks above the minor economic hardship threshold 
receive permits that are freely transferable. Transferable permits allow the permit holder to sell their 
permit on the open market, gift their permit, or bequest their permit to whomever they will (Shriver 
et al., 2014). The adjudication of permit applications can take several years.5 LEPs must be renewed 
every year, regardless o f whether or not the permit holder ‘fishes’ the permit (AS 16.43.150 (c)).
The complex points system was a means to allocate permits in an equitable manner, to not only the 
top harvesters, but also the marginal harvesters; rural fishermen in “subsistence-oriented 
communities” where commercial harvests provide a vital income source despite comparatively low 
harvests (Adasiak, 1979). Despite these design efforts, the Alaska LEP program has been criticized 
for poor understating of the socioeconomic and cultural context of local fishing communities in the 
initial LEP design and the permit drain after initial allocation from local fishing community residents 
to urban and nonresident fishermen with greater access to capital (Koslow, 1981; Knapp, 2011). 
Criddle and Shimizu (2014) offer, “The link between LEP program design, unfettered transfer of 
LEPs, and the erosion o f  (sic) regional economies is an unresolved public policy concern.”
Alaska Hatchery Production
Alaska’s salmon fisheries are augmented by substantial hatchery-reared salmon production and 
release, notably in Prince William Sound and Southeast Alaska. Hatchery-reared salmon are reared to 
smolts in hatcheries and then released to grow in Alaskan waters and become part o f the commercial 
common property fishery (Vercessi, 2013). The hatchery-reared juveniles grow up in the wild and are
4 The Alaska Legislature clearly defined an entry permit (LEP) as a “use privilege that m ay be modified or revoked by the 
legislature without compensation” in the Limited Entry Act (AS 16.43.150 (e)).
5 The CFEC issues interim entry permits to applicants while their application is in the adjudications process. Interim entry 
permits are not permanent or transferable.
6not distinguished from wild Alaskan salmon in exvessel purchases or marketing. In 2012, 
approximately 31% of the statewide commercial harvest was comprised of hatchery-reared salmon 
(Vercessi, 2013). ADF&G estimates hatchery contributions by recovery o f coded-wire-tag and 
thermal otolith marking from hatchery-reared salmon (Gray et al., 2014). Figure 1 shows the annual 
percentage of hatchery-reared salmon as part o f the commercial common property fishery (ADF&G, 
2014). Figure 2 provides Alaska commercial salmon harvest, in millions o f fish, by source for the 
years 1900 — 2013 (ADF&G, 2014).
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Figure 1. Percentage of hatchery produced salmon harvested in Alaska commercial common 
property fisheries (CCPH), 2000 -2012 (ADF&G, 2014).
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Figure 2. Alaska commercial salmon harvests by source, 1900 -2013 (ADF&G, 2014).
Alaska’s salmon hatchery production began in 1971 as a division within ADF&G and expanded in 
1974 with passage o f a private nonprofit hatchery program (AS 16.10.400). The private nonprofit 
hatcheries are funded through a 3% exvessel salmon enhancement tax and “cost recovery” fisheries 
where hatcheries (or their agents) harvest fish in “terminal harvest areas” and sell the catch (AS 
16.10.455). Adasiak (1979) posits that without the LEP program the private nonprofit hatchery 
program would not have passed and fishermen would not have supported programs that required an 
assessment to fund.
Hatchery production in Alaska is not without controversy, Hilborn and Eggers (2000) have asserted 
the hatchery production often replaces wild stock returns, specifically in the high hatchery 
production area o f Prince William Sound. A cost-benefit analysis o f the Alaska hatchery 
enhancements found that during the late 1980s and early 1990s, the cost of running the hatcheries 
exceeded the pecuniary benefits o f the additional salmon production (Boyce et al., 1993). Ruggerone 
et al. (2010) have expressed concern that the increases in salmon hatchery production across the 
North Pacific affect density dependent processes of growth during the ocean production phase, 
where wild and hatchery-reared salmon compete for resources.
Alaska Salmon Market
Shortly following implementation o f the LEP program in Alaska, the Fishery Conservation 
Management Act o f 1976 established the 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone and the regional 
fisheries management councils (P.L. 94-265). The creation o f the exclusive economic zone and
8enlarged federal management was beneficial to Alaska salmon as the federal government banned 
foreign fishing vessels from harvesting salmon within America’s exclusive economic zone and federal 
managers placed limits on salmon bycatch in the groundfish fisheries (Criddle and Shimizu, 2014). 
Along with LEP implementation, control of the territorial sea and exclusion of foreign vessels, 
hatchery production, decreasing salmon returns in other parts of the world, and active management, 
statewide salmon returns and harvests increased as did exvessel values. These capitalized rents were 
evident by the increasing asset value of salmon LEPs into the 1980s. A shock to the Alaskan salmon 
fishery came in the early 1990s as increased production of farmed Atlantic salmon (Salmon salar) from 
Norway, Canada, the UK, and Chile caused the price of Alaskan salmon to drop along with salmon 
LEP values (Herrmann et al., 1993; Herrmann, 1994; Barnett et al., 2003; Williams et al., 2009; 
Criddle, 2012). Alaska’s salmon fishery, which is oriented towards external markets, suffered a severe 
shock when suddenly it had to compete with farmed salmon (Criddle, 2012; Criddle and Shimizu, 
2014). Farmed salmon has the advantage o f providing fresh year-round, expectable product deliveries 
to worldwide markets in contrast to the dynamic and seasonal nature o f wild salmon harvests 
(Criddle and Shimizu, 2014).
Pacific salmon is an important component of the larger Alaska seafood industry. In 2013, the 
McDowell group estimated that the seafood industry in Alaska is the largest employment sector 
following government employment. Harvests of Pacific salmon in Alaska account for 95% of all 
salmon harvest in the U.S. but only about 23% of the current U.S. domestic supply of salmon 
(McDowell Group, 2013). Most of the U.S. domestic supply of salmon now comes from imports of 
farmed Atlantic salmon (McDowell Group, 2013). To counter the increased farmed salmon 
production that began in the 1990s, wild Alaska salmon has been increasingly marketed as a separate 
and superior ‘natural’ product that differentiates Alaska salmon from farmed Atlantic salmon.
Salmon exvessel prices have increased as marketing has differentiated wild Alaska salmon as coming 
from the pristine wild Alaska environment. This is part o f the larger transition worldwide o f marine 
products from commodities to differentiated goods (Criddle & Shimizu, 2014).
While Alaskan fisheries management is considered successful from the biological perspective, from 
an economic perspective, it has been described as, “an abject economic failure” (Criddle, 2012). 
Criddle and Shimizu (2014) posit that the economic crash o f the salmon fisheries in the early 2000s 
was preconditioned by unresolved “fundamental vulnerabilities” in Alaska’s salmon fisheries that 
include, “inexorable dynamics of the race-for-fish” that is not controlled through LEP management 
and salmon aquaculture production that is innovative, driven to adopt cost reducing technological 
innovations and has a direct impact on the price o f wild salmon.
9Buyback as a Fishery Management Tool
Often, after an LEP program has been implemented and fishing capacity has continued to expand
along margins not controlled by the LEP, there are calls for retirement/buyback of some o f the
issued LEPs. These calls are motivated by the desire of existing LEP-holders to improve their
economic returns (GAO, 2000; Weninger and McConnell, 2000; Clark et al., 2005). A buyback serves
to contract the numbers participating in rent dissipation (Wilen, 1988). Buybacks can target vessels,
gear, and/or licenses. Buybacks can serve as a vehicle to limitation and/or help rebuild stocks in
over-fished fisheries, but only if  managers can limit post-buyback increases in fishing power (Groves
and Squires, 2007). Addressing over-capacity issues is not the sole motivation for buyback; Squires
(2010) compiled the motivations for buyback that include:
.( i)d ire c t ly  increasing economic efficiency; (ii) modernizing fleets and adjusting 
their structure and composition; (iii) facilitating the transition from fisheries with 
overexploited stock and overcapacity to private or common rights-based 
conservation and management; (iv) providing alternatives when rights-based 
management is infeasible; (v) providing disaster or crisis relief; (vi) addressing 
compensation and distributional issues; (vii) conserving common resources 
underlying fishery; and (viii) conserving biodiversity and ecological public goods 
(Squires, 2010, p. 368).
The verdict on whether buybacks are an appropriate vehicle to address the above motivations is still 
up for debate. In 2000, the U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO) reviewed buybacks in the 
New England groundfish, Bering Sea pollock, and Washington State salmon fisheries. Overall, the 
GAO found that re-entry of vessels and fishermen mitigated much o f the temporary gains in the 
reduction in fishing capacity (GAO, 2000). Clark et al. (2005) present a vessel buyback subsidy model 
and conclude that even if  post-buyback capacity “seepage” can be overcame, the buyback “subsidies” 
can have a negative impact on economic efficiency.
Alaska’s LEP statue includes a  buyback provision that was part of the ‘secondary’ limitation process 
that aimed at reducing the number of permits in any one LEP fishery to an “optimum number”.6 
The CFEC determines the optimum number o f LEPs that balances the economic health o f the 
fishery; allows for an efficient harvest; and avoids economic hardship to LEP holders (AS 16.43.290). 
If  the CFEC’s determined optimum number of LEPs is less than the current number o f LEPs, the 
Limited Entry Act’s provisions authorize the CFEC to conduct a voluntary buyback o f permits until 
the optimum number is reached, financed by an LEP exvessel tax (AS 16.43.310). Optimum number 
determinations are time intensive and have only been completed in three LEP fisheries and only one
6 As originally written, the Limited Entry Act’s buyback provision was determined to violate the Alaska 
constitutional prohibition against dedicated funds. As part of the larger S01A buyback legislative changes, the 
Alaska Legislature amended the buyback provisions in 2002 with House Bill 286.
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salmon LEP fishery.7 No buyback has been completed utilizing the Limited Entry Act’s buyback 
provision. Although this second stage o f limitation was anticipated to proceed immediately after 
initial limitation, the institutional focus of the CFEC moved away from consolidation to adjudicating 
initial LEP applications (Schelle et al., 2004). In 1988, the Alaska Supreme Court issued a decision 
that would highlight a singular drawback to buyback in Alaska LEP fisheries. Johns v. State articulated 
the balance that CFEC must strike between the tensions o f constitutional clauses in the limited entry 
amendment in Article VIII section 15, No Exclusive Right o f  Fishery and Article VII Section 3 Common Use. 
The Court stated:
[T]here is a tension between the limited entry clause of the state constitution and the 
clauses of the constitution which guarantee open fisheries. We suggested that to be 
constitutional, a limited entry system should impinge as little as possible on the open 
fishery clauses consistent with the constitutional purposes of limited entry, namely, 
prevention of distress to fishermen and resource conservation. Ostrosky. 667 P.2d 
at 1191. The optimum number provision o f the Limited Entry Act is the mechanism 
by which limited entry is meant to be restricted to its constitutional purposes.
Without this mechanism, limited entry has the potential to be a system which has 
the effect of creating an exclusive fishery to ensure the wealth o f the permit holders 
and permits values, while exceeding the constitutional purposes of limited entry.
The Johns decision had two major impacts on LEP management in Alaska. First, it articulated that 
the optimum number was the mechanism that made LEP management constitutional. The optimum 
number would allow a means for the CFEC to issue more LEPs if a fishery was deemed “too 
exclusive”. Exclusivity of an LEP fishery is constitutional only if  the level of exclusivity is for 
resource conservation or to prevent economic distress. Second, the decision heuristically pointed out 
the paradoxical drawback to buyback in a LEP fishery using the Limited Entry Act’s buyback 
provision. Namely that if  post-buyback LEP fishery was deemed too exclusive, the CFEC would be 
constitutionally bound to issue more LEPs, even as the state was taxing fishermen to pay for the cost 
o f the buyback.
2.0 LEP Program Description and Buyback Outcomes 
Statement of Problem
The 2008 buyback using federal grant money bought and retired 35 LEPs. The 2012 buyback 
financed by the federal reduction loan permanently retired an additional 64 LEPs. This amounted to
7 The three LEP fisheries where optimum number determinations have been made are the Southeast Alaska 
roe herring purse seine fishery (20 AAC 05.1140); the Bristol Bay salmon drift gillnet fishery (20 AAC 05.1147); 
and the Northern Southeast Inside sablefish longline fishery (20 AAC 05.1145).
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a 23.6% reduction in LEPs8. Figure 3 illustrates a conceptual long-run demand function for S01A 
LEP permits. The market for S01A LEPs is in part determined by the fixed supply of LEPs. It is 
expected that the permanent removal of LEPs from the market, ceteris paribus, would raise the 
selling price from an initial equilibrium price A to equilibrium price B after the 2008 buyback and to 
equilibrium price C after the 2012 buyback and a demand shift that reflects increases in exvessel 
gross revenues due to increased exvessel prices. This paper seeks to disentangle the effects of the 
reduced supply o f LEPs (due to the buybacks) from changes in the demand for LEP (due to 
increased exvessel price). Specifically, this paper seeks to determine if  the 2008 and 2012 buybacks 
had a statistically significant effect on the real prices o f S01A LEPs. In addition, this paper will 
evaluate the buybacks in light of their stated goals.
S3 S2 SI
315 379 419
N um ber o f Perm anent SOI A  LEPs
Figure 3. Conceptual representation of changes in the equilibrium price of S01A LEPs in response to 
increased (D1 to D2) long-run demand and reductions in the supply o f permits from S1 to S2 and S3 
in occasioned by two buybacks.
Limited Entry in Alaska’s Salmon Purse Seine Fishery
The Southeast Alaska (S01A) salmon purse seine fishery was one of the 19 original LEP fisheries 
(Shriver et al., 2014). Purse seine vessels encircle schools or shoals of their target fish with a curtain 
o f netting that is pursed at the bottom to entrap their target within a bowl of netting that can be 
drawn aboard (Figure 4). The CFEC designated the Southeast salmon purse seine fishery as a salmon 
fishery that had reached levels of participation that required limitation of entry in 1974 (20 AAC
8 The reduction in LEPs is 24.8% when we include the four LEPs that were cancelled for non-payment of fees 
and one that was cancelled administratively.
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05.310). In total, the CFEC issued 419 permanent transferable LEPs (see Table 1). The CFEC also 
issued non-permanent interim entry permits to applicants who did not appear to have sufficient 
participation history; interim permits lasted until the applications were adjudicated. It was not until 
2003 that the final S01A application was adjudicated and a final decision made. Appendix 1 provides 
a time-series of the number of interim entry and permanent permits renewed and fished each year 
(1975 — 2013). Similar to many other LEP programs, the limitation of the Southeast salmon purse 
seine fishery did not achieve any major fleet reduction from its open-access state; rather it is thought 
to have prevented further increases in the number o f participating vessels (Schelle and Muse, 1984). 
Limitation did not limit further increases in marginal effort or transfers from less effective to more 
effective fishermen.
Table 1. Initial issuance, total net changes, and year-end 2013 permanent limited entry permits 
(LEPs) in the southeast salmon purse seine fishery by resident type. The migration change represents 
residents who moved out of state, but continued fishing in the fishery. The transfer change 
represents a resident who transferred their permit (either through gift, sale, or inheritance) to a 
nonresident (CFEC, 2014).
Cancelled Buyback
Total
Total
2013
Total
Year
Initially Percent Transfer Migration 
Issued Issued Change Change 2008 2012
Total
Canceled
Total
Change
Year
End
End
Percent
Resident 214 51.1% 4 -17 -9 -21 -33 -46 168 53.3%
Nonresident 205 48.9% -4 17 -26 -43 -71 -58 147 46.7%
Total 419 100% 0 0 -35 -64 -104 -104 315 100%
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Table 1 provides an overview of initial LEP allocation and changes in LEP holdings by resident type 
(either Alaska-resident or nonresident) in the S01A fishery for the years 1975 — 2013 (CFEC, 2014). 
Between 1975 and 2013, the CFEC issued 419 permanent S01A LEPs. Of this total, Alaskans 
received 51% (214/419) of the S01A LEPs and nonresidents received 48.9% (205/419). O f the 19 
original salmon LEP fisheries, the S01A fishery has the highest proportion of nonresident LEPs 
issued. In comparison, in the Bristol Bay salmon drift gillnet LEP fishery, 39.7% of the initial 
allocation of LEPs went to nonresidents (Shriver et al., 2014). By the end o f 2013, the total number 
o f S01A LEPs was reduced to 315 permits due to permit cancellations (including permits eliminated 
by the buybacks). O f the 315 permanent S01A LEPs, Alaskans held 53.3% (168/315) at year-end 
2013.
The Economics of the Southeast Alaska Salmon Purse Seine Fishery 
Sp ecies Com position
The S01A fishery harvests five species of North Pacific salmon: Chinook Salmon O. tshawytscha, 
Sockeye Salmon O. nerka, Coho Salmon O. kisutch, Pink Salmon, and Chum Salmon. Two o f these 
species, Pink Salmon and Chum Salmon, account for over 95% of the volume and about 84% of the 
gross earnings o f the fishery (Table 2). According to the Alaska Department of Fish & Game 
managers, the S01A fishery has harvested about 77% of the total commercial Southeast Alaska 
salmon harvest in numbers o f fish over the period of 1960 — 2013 (Gray et al., 2014).
Table 2. Percent of total value and volume o f southeast salmon purse seine fishery by species, 1975 — 
2013 (CFEC, 2014)
Species Percent of T otal Value Percent o f Total Volume
Chinook Salmon 1% <1%
Sockeye Salmon 11% 3%
Coho Salmon 4% 2%
Pink Salmon 62% 76%
Chum Salmon 22% 19%
The majority o f the harvested pounds in the fishery consist of Pink and Chum Salmon. Figure 5 
presents a break out of harvest poundage by salmon species. It is clear that Pink and Chum Salmon 
harvest volume dominate in the S01A fishery. Pink Salmon mature and complete their life-cycle 
within a two-year period (ADF&G, 2014). This two-year life cycle has created odd and even year 
populations that are genetically unique (ADF&G, 2014). The distinct odd and even year populations
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of Pink Salmon translate into harvest compositions that can vary significantly from year to year (see 
Figure 5).
Year
Figure 5. Percentage of harvest poundage by species, 1975 — 2013 (CFEC, 2014).
P in k  Salm on P rices, Chum Salm on P rices, H arvest, an d  T o tal Gross E arn ings
Pink and Chum Salmon play an important role in gross earnings for the S01A fishery. Figure 6 
presents the total real estimated gross earnings and estimated average real exvessel price per pound 
for Pink and Chum Salmon in the S01A fishery (CFEC, 2014). Earnings were adjusted using the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) with 2013 as the base (United States Department of Labor, Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, 2014). The real price of Pink Salmon in the S01A fishery fell from a high o f $1.62 in 
1988 to a low o f $0.12 a pound in 2002. The real price of Chum Salmon peaked at $2.71 in 1978; fell 
to $0.76 per pound in 1986, reached $2.05 per pound in 1988, and bottomed out at below $0.50 per 
pound from 1996 through 2007. While real gross earnings in the S01A fishery is a function of catches 
and prices of all five species of salmon, earnings are most closely correlated with pink salmon real 
earnings (r = 0.94323) (Table 3).
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Figure 6. Annual mean real exvessel price per pound (2013 base) for Pink Salmon, Chum Salmon, 
and total real gross earnings in the Southeast Alaska (S01A) salmon purse seine fishery, 1975 — 2013 
(CFEC, 2014).
Table 3. Pearson correlation coefficients (r) table for real gross earnings
Variable r Prob | p | ^ 0 OBS
Chum Salmon pounds -0.152 0.356 39
Chum Salmon real gross earnings 0.185 0.260 39
Chum Salmon real exvessel price/lb. 0.180 0.273 39
Pink Salmon pounds 0.363 0.023 39
Pink Salmon real gross earnings 0.943 <.001 39
Pink Salmon real exvessel price/lb. 0.217 0.184 39
Figure 6 shows the movement in real mean exvessel price per pound for Pink and Chum Salmon as 
well as real total gross earnings during the time o f  LEP management. Figure 7 presents the total 
harvest and real earnings in the S01A fishery during the time o f LEP management.
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Figure 7. Total harvest and real gross earnings in the Southeast Alaska (S01A) salmon purse seine 
fishery, 1975 -  2013 (CFEC, 2014).
C hange in  P roduct Form
Pink Salmon represents the vast majority o f the S01A fishery harvest. Over time, Southeast Alaska 
processors have shifted production from low value canned Pink Salmon to higher value frozen 
products. Figure 8 displays the percent of total wholesale value by product form while Figure 9 
displays the information by percent of net weight by product form. In both value and weight, the 
shift away from lower value canned salmon to higher value frozen product is evident beginning in 
the early 2000’s.
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Figure 8. Southeast Pink Salmon percent o f total wholesale value by product form, 1984-2013 
(ADF&G, 2014).
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Figure 9. Southeast Pink Salmon percent o f net weight by product form, 1984 — 2013 (ADF&G, 
2014).
M ean Gross E arn ings p e r P erm it F ish ed
Mean real gross earnings per permit fished is an index of the return to fishing an S01A permit. Mean 
gross earnings fell to $95,329 per permit fished in 2002, a fifth of the relative high of $462,760 in 
1989 and 18% of the 2013 high of $523,137. Figure 10 presents the mean real estimated gross 
earnings per LEP fished and the number of LEPs fished in the S01A fishery. While not every permit
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fished earns an equal share of the fishery’s revenue, variations in mean earnings per permit highlight 
the decline in earnings during the early 2000’s and recent increases. The year 2013 stands out as a 
record year buoyed by a record Pink Salmon return and harvest in Southeast Alaska (Gray et al., 
2014). Recall that the CFEC issued a total of 419 permanent LEPs, but that the CFEC does not only 
issue permanent LEPs. While a fisher’s application is being decided by CFEC adjudications, the 
fisher receives an interim entry permit that allows entry into the fishery. An interim entry LEP 
cannot be transferred and is not considered permanent. Allocation o f permanent permits can take 
many years. Figure 11 rescales Figure 10 and provides the mean gross earnings per total permits 
(fished or unfished and permanent or interim) in the fishery. Appendix 1 provides time series 
information on the count o f permanent and interim entry permits renewed in the fishery. Figure 10 
counts all permits fished in the fishery whether they were permanent LEPs or interim entry permits 
that were fished while an applicant was waiting for final adjudication of their permit.
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Figure 10. Mean real gross earnings per fished limited entry permit and number of fished limited 
entry permits in the Southeast Alaska S01A fishery, 1975-2013 (CFEC, 2014).
19
e
a
e
$500,000 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 500
450
$400,000
' — V
400
350$350,000
$300,000 300
9^0250$250,000 
r>m non 900200$200,000 
f 1 non 1 qn$ 50,000
$100,000
,1 I 50$50,000
$0 i i i i i i i I I I I I I I l l I I I I I 0
5r-CN
Onr- oo 3 5
I Mean Earnings Per Permit ■Total Permits
o
h ( ^ r Hf n i / ) h C ' r HC n  On On <0 <0 <0 <0 <0CN CN o o o o o o o
Figure 11. Mean real gross earnings per limited entry permit (fished or unfished and permanent or 
interim) and total number o f limited entry permits in the Southeast Alaska S01A fishery, 19785-2013 
(CFEC, 2014).
P erm it V alue
The asset value of LEPs reflects the discounted net present value of expected earnings in perpetuity 
(Karpoff 1984a; Karpoff 1984b; Huppert et al., 1996; Knapp, 2011). Expected earnings are informed 
by past earnings (Karpoff, 1984a; Knapp, 2011). Thus, changes in the market value of LEPs can be 
used as a measure of changes in permit-holder expectations about future earnings. Huppert et al. 
(1996) found that for Alaska drift gillnet salmon LEPs, the LEP system created enduring economic 
rents that are capitalized in the asset value of the LEP.
Each Southeast seine LEP is a homogenous use right. The permit, when renewed annually with the 
CFEC allows the permit holder access to harvest salmon in the commercial salmon seine openings 
throughout the Southeast Alaska salmon registration area. The majority of permit transactions within 
this fishery have been by sale transaction (Shriver et al., 2014, p. 125). Roughly one quarter of all 
permit transfers are registered as gifts, 2.1% through trade, and 2% through “other” means (Shriver 
et al., 2014, p. 92). As a homogenous good, the value of every S01A LEP is identical. In this analysis 
like Karpoff (1983b), the LEP is treated as a capital asset, a use-right that entitles the right-holder to 
an expected flow o f income over time.
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LEP prices are determined in the open market through willing exchanges between individuals. When 
the LEP market is in equilibrium, the market-clearing price will be equal to the value placed on it by 
the marginal permit holder (Muse, 1990). The value the marginal permit holder places on the permit 
should equate to the present value of the stream of expected future net benefits the permit holder 
expects to receive from the use-access the permit explicitly confers to the holder (Huppert et al., 
1996). I f  the market price of the LEP was higher than the value placed on the permit by the 
fisherman, then the fisherman would sell their LEP and the new equilibrium market price would be 
somewhat lower (Muse, 1990). The reverse is also true, if  the market value o f the LEP was lower 
than the reservation price of the marginal fisherman, prospective entrants would bid up the price of 
LEPs (Muse, 1990). The marginal fisherman may not be the least productive fisher. The marginal 
fisherman could be that the most productive fisher, as the most productive fisher may have the 
highest opportunity cost (Muse, 1990). Assuming that fishers are rational individuals they will buy 
and sell their use-permits in a manner that they think will be the most beneficial to them.
Information on permit prices is easily accessible to fishers. The CFEC reports monthly estimates and 
annual average permit values for each limited fishery (CFEC, 2014). In addition, multiple permit 
brokerages publish listing for permits wanted and permits listed for sale. Likewise, fishery 
performance information is also easily accessible—historical gross earnings estimates, by fishery, are 
available online from CFEC. The ADF&G also publishes salmon run projections so that fishers have 
preseason estimates of the number and age-composition of fish in the upcoming harvest year. 
Additionally, annual meetings between AMBs, researchers, hatcheries, processors, and S01A 
fishermen are held to discuss the previous season and plan for the following.
Figure 12 displays a time-series graph of annual average estimates of S01A LEP value from 1982 
through 2013 (CFEC, 2014). These estimates represent mean arms-length transactions (Shriver et al., 
2014). Excluded from CFEC permit value reports are those permits sold for prices substantially 
below the mean as well as transactions that reflect transfers to relatives or close friends (Shriver et al., 
2014). Nominal annual average estimated permit values are graphed in blue and real (inflation 
adjusted, base 2013) permit values are graphed in red. LEP prices were elevated by strong exvessel 
salmon prices and gross earnings in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. The two vertical lines delineate 
buyback years. The nadir of S01A LEP value occurred in 2002, when in inflation-adjusted dollars, the 
permit value was $29,310. When the price of salmon fell, the concomitant drop in permit prices was 
a signal that fishers did not believe the remuneration of participation in the fishery would be worth as 
much as it had been in the recent past. Since that time, there has been a sharp increase in real permit 
prices; permit value reached a new high of $300,800 in 2013. What is not clear from the raw
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numbers, and will be explored in this analysis, is the extent to which the rise in permit value is due to 
the buybacks rather than increases in catch and price.
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Figure 12. Real and nominal S01A LEP value fishery 1982 — 2013 (CFEC, 2014).
Northern Economics (2014) reviewed the buyback in the S01A LEP fishery and speculated that the 
rise in LEP value beginning in 2010 was fueled in part by speculation over the impeding buyback. In 
the long-run supply of S01A LEPs shown in Figure 3, the supply of LEPs is fixed by the amount the 
state has issued. In the short-run, the transactional market for S01A LEPs, the number of permitees 
willing to sell their permits will change with a rise in permit value caused by a shift in demand. The 
buyback financed by the federal loan used in 2012 was known long before the bidding process 
actually began. This may have caused an increase in demand for S01A permits leading up to the 
buyback, as shown in the short-run model in Figure 13.
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Figure 13. Conceptual representation of changes in the equilibrium price o f S01A LEPS in response 
to increased (D1 to D2) short-run demand precipitated by planned buyback o f permits.
P erm it L aten cy
Beginning in the 1990’s and continuing into the early 2000’s, the price of Alaska salmon dropped 
across the state, including in the S01A fishery. Increased production of farmed Atlantic salmon and a 
shifting demand in global salmon markets reduced willingness to pay for Alaskan salmon and 
reduced exvessel prices throughout Alaska (Herrmann et al., 1993; Herrmann, 1994; Barnett et al., 
2003; Williams et al., 2009). Because catches stayed roughly constant, gross earnings for Alaska 
salmon fisheries dropped in concert with the decline in exvessel prices. The reduction in current and 
expected future gross earnings caused the asset value of salmon LEPs to drop, leaving many 
permitees with debt burdens in excess of the market value of their permits. As a consequence o f low 
exvessel prices, unsustainable debts, and high operating costs, many permitees did not fish their 
LEPs. These latent (un-fished) permits allowed larger average catches for those who continued 
fishing and thus helped reduce the erosion of their average gross earnings. Fishery participation in 
the S01A fishery (permits fished) dropped from a high o f 394 permits fished in 1988 to a low of 209 
permits fished in 2004 (Figure 14). Note the substantial decrease in participation beginning in 2001; 
in 2004, nearly half of all permits were not fished (Figure 14).
23
Year
Figure 14. Permits renewed and fished in the S01A fishery, 1975 — 2013, (CFEC, 2014).
M om entum  for B uyb ack
In response to the economic crash of Alaska’s salmon fisheries in the late 1990s, Alaska’s salmon 
fishermen, policy makers, and processers explored ways to improve the market for Alaska wild 
salmon, increase product quality, reduce costs, and restructure Alaska’s salmon fisheries (CFEC, 
1998).
As real exvessel salmon prices started to slowly recover, so did mean gross earnings. As returns 
increased, the specter of increased participation (and lower returns) from latent LEPs returning to 
the fishery loomed large over permitees. Many ideas were proposed to restructure Alaska’s limited 
salmon fisheries to allow greater returns to permitees (Barnett et al., 2003). S01A permitees through, 
the non-profit corporation the Southeast Revitalization Association (SRA), worked with state and 
federal government to pursue changes in state law to allow a private buyback o f S01A LEPs. The 
SRA was the first salmon fishery organization organized under 2002 legislation that encouraged 
formation of regional salmon fishery organizations for the purpose of fleet consolidation.
The SRA pursued both federal grant money and a federally backed fishery reduction loan to purchase 
and permanently retire S01A LEPs. The SRA’s original plan had been to use the federal grant money 
in conjunction with the federally-backed fishery reduction loan. In praxis, the process of modifying a 
federal program to a state-permit fishery took longer than stakeholders expected (PSVOA, 2008).
The SRA was the first to try use the federally backed fishery reduction loan under Section 312 (b) of
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the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization A ct o f 2006 (MSA) to retire 
permits from a state-managed fishery (P.L. 109-479). All other programs using the fishery reduction 
loan program for buyback have been for federally managed fisheries.
ADF&G Management of the Southeast Alaska Salmon Purse Seine Fishery
The ADF&G manages the S01A fishery based on inseason assessments of the primarily target 
species, Pink Salmon and Chum Salmon to meet escapement goals and provide for sustained yield 
harvests (Gray et al., 2014). Regulations allow salmon purse seine fishing in designated districts that 
are open and closed to fishing set by AMBs through EO. Figure 15 is a map of the districts. ADF&G 
splits the large area open to salmon seine fishing in Southeast into two management areas for 
purposes of forecasting, inseason management, and calculating harvest. The two sub-management 
areas are Southern Southeast (Districts 1 — 7) and Northern Southeast (Districts 9-14). Although 
subdivided into two distinct areas for management purposes, S01A LEP holders are free to fish in 
any area open to fishing as the entire area in one salmon registration area. AMBs coordinate 
management across the sub-districts to distribute seine effort (Gray et al., 2014). Inseason 
management actions made by AMBs are predicated by inseason assessments of run strength based 
on aerial and foot surveys of spawning grounds, test fishing, and dockside sampling (Gray et al., 
2014).
25
Figure 15. Southeast Alaska purse seine fishing areas (ADF&G, 2014).
Alaska statutes limit the length of salmon seine vessels to 58 feet overall (AS 16.05.835). Regulations 
dictate the confines of seine nets allowed in the fishery (5 AC 33.332). The vessel length limitation 
was implemented before limited entry as a means to control effort. The percentage of limit seiners in 
Southeast increased from 4.8% in 1978 to over 50% in 2008 and mean vessel horsepower has 
increased from 218 horsepower to 335 horsepower over the same period (Iverson and Farrington, 
2010).
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The fishery’s harvest is augmented by hatchery-produced salmon produced by the Northern 
Southeast Regional Aquaculture Association, the Southern Southeast Regional Aquaculture 
Association, Douglas Island Pink and Chum, Inc., and Armstrong-Keta, Inc. These hatchery- 
produced salmon that return are part of the commercial common property fishery. In 2013, 
hatchery-produced salmon were harvested in six Terminal Harvest Areas where hatchery reared fish 
enter terminal areas near hatchery release sites and nine hatchery cost recovery locations (Gray et al., 
2014). Management focus is concentrated on managing the harvest of wild stocks and the harvest of 
hatchery fish according to allocative decisions approved by the Board of Fisheries (Gray et al., 2014).
2008 Buyback of 35 S01A Permits
In November o f 2005, Congress allocated $3 million dollars in grant money to the SRA for fleet 
consolidation.9 The SRA used the federal grant, administered by ADF&G, to purchase and retire 35 
S01A LEPS in 2008 using a voluntary, reverse auction. The SRA’s goal was to retire at least 10% of 
the permanent S01A LEPs (SRA, 2008). At the time o f initial notice of auction was mailed to all 
S01A permitees in March, 2008 there were 415 permanent permits (Shriver et al., 2014). A total of 82 
bids were submitted to the SRA (SRA, 2008). Individual bids ranged from $44,000 to $700,000 
(nominal) (SRA, 2008). At the time o f the bidding process, the published LEP value was reported by 
the CFEC was $65,600 (nominal) (2014). The SRA initially accepted 35 bids for a total o f $2,798,115 
(nominal). Some bidders withdrew their bids after they were accepted by the SRA, so the next 
highest bids were accepted for a new grand total o f $2,870,355 (nominal) (SRA, 2008). The accepted 
bids were not included in permit price calculations for CFEC permit value report (CFEC, 2014). The 
2008 buyback successfully retired 35 permits from the S01A fishery, or 8.4% o f all S01A LEPs.
2012 Buyback of 64 S01A Permits
Congress first passed legislation to authorize a reduction loan for the S01A fishery in December 2004 
as part o f the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005 (P.L. 108-447). The law authorized a fishing 
capacity reduction program for the Southeast Alaska purse seine fishery with a federal loan o f $50 
million with a 30-year term and $500,000 directed to the Pacific Coastal Salmon Recovery for the 
cost of the loan (P.L. 108-447 Title II, Division B, §209). The original federal reduction loan (P.L. 
108-447) authorization was amended in January, 2007, by passage o f the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery 
Conservation and Management Reauthorization A ct o f 2006 (P.L. 109-479). The amendment reduced the
9 Conference Report on H.R. 2862, Science, State, Justice, Commerce and Related Agencies Appropriations 
Act.
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fleet reduction loan from $50 million to $25 million (P.L. 109-479 §121). In addition, the law 
exempted the Southeast Alaska Fisheries Communities Capacity Reduction from §312 of the 
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (16 USC 1861a) except for 
subsections (b)(1) (c) and (d). Section 312 (b)(1)(c) states that the program, “is cost-effective and, in 
the instance of a program involving an industry fee system, prospectively capable of repaying any 
debt obligation incurred under section 1111 of title XI o f the Merchant Marine Act, 1936.” Section 
(d) mandates that the program is subject to referendum approved by a majority of the permitees. The 
law set a 3% fee ceiling on fees paid by the remaining permitees and set the term o f the loan for 40 
years. Additionally, the law clarified that the program, “shall be conducted under Alaska law by the 
Southeast Revitalization Association” (P.L. 109-479 §121).
At the end of November 2011, the SRA sent bid packets to every holder o f a valid S01A permit 
using permit holding and address information from the CFEC (SRA, 2012). Unlike the 2008 
program, all bids were irrevocable, meaning that a bidder could not withdraw or modify their bid 
once submitted (76 FR 61985). In addition, the reduction plan had to be approved by NMFS and 
approved by a majority of the fishery’s LEP holders in a referendum vote. Seventy-four bid packets 
were returned by the December 28, 2011 deadline (SRA, 2012). The SRA ranked the bids from 
lowest dollar amount to highest dollar amount. In nominal terms, the lowest dollar bid was $175,000 
and the highest was $350,000 (SRA, 2012). At the time of bidding, December 2011, the published 
CFEC permit value was $152,800 (nominal) (CFEC, 2014). The SRA had to make the determination 
whether the number of accepted bids would be, “sufficient to achieve a substantial reduction in 
harvest capacity and increases in economic efficiencies” (76 FR 61987).
O f the 74 bids, the SRA accepted 64, for a sum o f $13,133,030 (nominal) and an average price per 
permit of $205,204 (SRA, 2012). O f the accepted bids, the bids ranged from $175,000 to $240,000 
(SRA, 2012). The 10 non-accepted bids ranged from a low o f $248,000 to a high o f $350,000 and a 
mean price of $268,450 (SRA, 2012). These 10 bids were not accepted by the SRA because they were 
determined to be, “ ... an excessive deviation from current fair market values, and, therefore, not 
cost-effective” (SRA, 2012). Moreover, the SRA maintained that if  they accepted bids in excess of 
$240,000, a vital segment of permitees might vote against the buyback in the referendum vote (SRA, 
2012).
The SRA notified the 63 individual bidders (one individual had 2 accepted bids) that their bids were 
accepted (SRA, 2012). Unlike the 2008 buyback administration, once the SRA accepted the 64 bids,
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the permitees were contractually obligated to follow through with relinquishment, on the condition 
that the majority of permitees in the S01A fishery approved the plan by referendum.
The SRA submitted the Capacity Reduction Plan f o r  the Southeast A laska Salmon Purse Seine Fishery to 
NMFS in January, 2012 (SRA, 2012). The Reduction Plan included the SRA’s supporting rationale 
that the plan would be cost effective, achieve the maximum sustainable reduction in capacity at the 
least cost, increase harvesting productivity for post-reduction permitees, improve flexibility in the 
conservation and management of the fishery and that the post-reduction fishery would be capable of 
repaying the loan (76 FR 61985). The SRA presented two main reasons why the reduction was cost 
effective. First, the average price o f the 64 accepted bids was reasonably related to current market 
LEP value and the fair market price the SRA believed would result from the removal o f LEPs. 
Second, the SRA concluded that the cost of the loan was justified by the reduction in fishing 
capacity.
It is interesting to note that the SRA projected that the average 2012 CFEC published permit value 
would be close to the mean accepted bid amount of $205,204 (nominal) (SRA, 2012). In fact, the 
2012 average permit value was $236,000, nearly $31,000 more than the mean accepted bid price.10 
The reasoning behind the SRA’s confidence in permit value increases post-reduction were articulated 
as:
The present fair market value is predicated on a total of 379 permits. If the Plan is 
approved and subject to a successful referendum, 315 permits or 83.1% of the 
existing permit total will remain eligible to participate in the fishery. The SRA 
maintains this reduction will result in a substantial increase in the fair market value 
o f the remaining permits to a level equal or greater than the average accepted bid 
amount (SRA, 2012).
The conclusion of the SRA’s Reduction Plan succinctly summarizes the SRA’s reasoning behind
implementing a reduction plan even as the economics of the fishery were improving:
The SRA recognizes there has been a substantial change in circumstances since the 
2006 enactment o f federal legislation to establish and implement this program. The 
initial motives for creating the program were predicated on stagnant exvessel salmon 
prices and lack of processing capacity, which were threatening the very economic 
viability of the fishery. Today the overriding motivation is to stabilize harvest 
productivity by those now participating in the fishery while maintaining orderly 
management of the fishery. Although the circumstances and challenges may have 
changed, the SRA maintains the solution remains the same - sustainable and cost- 
effective reduction in fishing capacity. Fortunately, the correctness of the SRA 
decision is ultimately and rightly left to the permit holder in the referendum process 
(SRA, 2012).
10 Accepted bid amounts were not used to calculate the published CFEC permit value.
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NMFS approved the SRA’s Reduction Plan on February 24, 2012 (77 FR 12568). In March, 2012, 
NMFS published a list o f all 379 S01A permitees who were eligible to vote in the referendum in the 
Federal Register, a request for comments on the list, and notice o f public meetings (77 FR 12568). 
NMFS held the informational public meetings in Seattle, WA, Petersburg, AK, Ketchikan, AK, and 
Sitka, AK (77 FR 12568). The referendum ballots were sent to each permit holder on March 30, 2012 
(77 FR 19004). The vote was to approve the post-reduction fee of no greater than 3% of exvessel 
value to repay the $13,133,030 forty-year-term loan to purchase and permanently retire the 64 
permits approved by the SRA, and subsequently NMFS. NMFS had to receive the ballots no later 
than 5 P.M. on April 30, 2012 to be considered valid (77 FR 19004). If a permit holder held more 
than one permit, they received one ballot for each permit they held (77 FR 19004).
NMFS received 269 votes within the voting period (77 FR 26744). O f the 269 votes, 215 approved 
the industry fees system necessary to repay the federal reduction loan. As the number of approval 
votes exceeded the necessary majority (190), the referendum was successful. NMFS published notice 
in the Federal Register with the names and permit numbers of permitees who would receive 
payments from NMFS (77 FR 26744).
In June of 2012, once NMFS received notice from the CFEC that permitees had relinquished their 
permits, payments were disbursed to the 63 former permitees (77 FR 26744). The reduction loan, 
amortized over a forty-year period, is to be repaid by the remaining S01A permitees. The exvessel fee 
to repay the loan has a ceiling of 3%, but NMFS can adjust the rate. If payments during the forty- 
year term at the 3% level are not sufficient to repay the loan, NMFS reserves the right to extend the 
term of repayment until the loan is paid in full. If ADF&G does not open the fishery during a year, 
the loan continues to accrue interest even though fee revenue is not collected (77 FR 26744).
NMFS published notice in the Federal Register that fee payment collection to service the reduction 
loan would begin on July 22, 2012 (77 FR 41754). The initial fee was set to 3% o f exvessel value 
(including bonus payments) (77 FR 41754). Regulations mandate that the first buyer (processor) of 
salmon delivered under an S01A permit must collect the fee and disburse payments to NMFS on a 
monthly basis. NMFS uses ADF&G fish tickets and Commercial Operator’s Annual Reports to 
verify fee payments. In June o f 2013, NMFS revised the fee rate to 1.5% to be effective June 1, 2013 
(78 FR 33810). NMFS reviews the tax rate each year to adjust for changes in anticipated fishery gross 
earnings. This means that in years when the fishery’s earnings are expected to be low, the rate will be 
adjusted upward and represent a larger share o f fishermen’s earnings.
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3.0 Methods and Analysis 
Data Sources
ADF&G ENCOAR Database
The Commercial Operator’s Annual Report (COAR) (ADF&G, 2014) is required by the Alaska 
Department of Fish and Game for all operations that buy, process, and/or sell fishery resources in 
Alaska (5 AAC 39.130 and 50 CFR 679). One section o f the report is devoted to exvessel purchases, 
where processors provide information on average exvessel prices paid to fishers. Another section of 
the report is devoted to wholesale production. Production data includes processed product forms 
and wholesale price information.
CFEC Permit File
The CFEC permit file contains data on persons who hold or have held CFEC LEPs (CFEC, 2014). 
It originates from CFEC permit renewal and transfer forms. A CFEC LEP may be held by more 
than one person in a year but only one person at a time. LEPs may be transferred between 
individuals on a permanent or temporary (emergency) basis. An emergency transfer is a temporary 
transfer between individuals in the event o f an emergency or unforeseen event. The Permit data file 
contains a field indicating the declared residency o f permitees. When a permit holder renews an 
existing permit, or receives a permit through permanent transfer, they must declare whether they are 
a resident of Alaska. The CFEC permit file was used to identify the number o f S01A LEPs renewed 
each year and all market transactions o f LEP transfers and LEP value.
CFEC Gross Earnings File
The CFEC Gross Earnings File (CFEC, 2014) was used as a source o f exvessel price and gross 
earnings estimates. The CFEC Gross Earnings file is based upon ADF&G fish tickets and is 
enhanced with CFEC data on fishing permits and estimated gross earnings. Earnings information is 
derived primarily through CFEC analysis of fish tickets and COAR data. Average exvessel price-per- 
pound estimates are calculated for each area (Southeast Alaska, Prince William Sound, Kodiak, etc.), 
species, gear, and delivery type (gutted, in-the-round, etc.) reported on fish tickets. These average 
prices are then applied to fish ticket line item data to estimate gross earnings. Gross earnings were 
calculated for the S01A fishery using a number o f filters. Only commercial catches were used to 
calculate gross earnings. Gross earnings were adjusted for inflation using CPI, with 2013 as the base 
year.
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Buyback Cohort Summary Statistics
The individuals who sold their LEPs in the buybacks are of interest in terms of equity, distribution, 
and motivations. The two cohorts o f individuals who sold permits in the buyback were, by in large, 
older (average o f 58 years) nonresidents who used the buybacks as an opportunity to leave the 
fishery. The 2008 cohort was comprised of 74% nonresidents and 26% residents (CFEC, 2014). The 
2012 buyback cohort was comprised o f 67% nonresidents and 33% residents (CFEC, 2014).
Figure 16 presents the permit holdings of the 2008 buyback cohort before and after buyback; it 
compares permit holding at year-end 2007 with year-end 2013. Figure 16 presents only permit 
holdings so this does not mean that the permits were actively fished. Appendix 2 provides a time- 
series by individual of S01A LEP holdings. Appendix 2 does not follow the longevity o f the 
particular LEP that was sold in the buyback, rather it is a time-series following the 2008 buyback 
cohort and whether at year-end they held an S01A LEP. There were no conditions set on future 
participation in the fishery. Six out of the 35 individuals who sold a LEP in the 2008 round still held 
a S01A LEP after the buyback was completed. Out of the 35 individuals in the 2008 buyback cohort, 
24 (68.5%) did not hold any Alaska fishery permits at year-end 2013. The individuals could still hold 
permits in other states. The other 11 individuals in the cohort held at least one Alaska fishery permit 
at year-end 2013.
Permit Group
Figure 16. CFEC permit holdings by the 2008 buyback cohort before and after buyback (CFEC, 
2014).11
11 Note here that while the halibut fishery is managed by NMFS RAM, IFQ fishers still require a non-limited 
CFEC halibut permit to land their harvest in the State of Alaska.
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Figure 17 presents the permit holdings of the 2012 buyback cohort before and after buyback; it 
compares permit holding at year-end 2011 with year-end 2013. Figure 17 presents only permit 
holdings, this does not mean that the permits were actively fished. Appendix 3 provides a time-series 
by individual of S01A LEP holdings. Appendix 3 does not follow the longevity of the particular LEP 
that was sold in the buyback, rather it is a time-series following the 2012 buyback cohort and whether 
at year-end they held an S01A permit. Five out of the 63 individuals who sold LEPs in the 2012 
round held a S01A LEP post-buyback. Out o f the 63 individuals in the 2012 buyback cohort, 35 
(55.6%) did not hold any Alaska fishery permits at year-end 2013. The individuals could still hold 
permits in other states. The other 28 individuals in the cohort held at least one Alaska fishery permit 
at year-end 2013.
Permit Group
Figure 17. CFEC permit holdings by the 2012 buyback cohort before and after buyback (CFEC, 
2014).12
Figure 18 presents information about the length of time LEPs sold in the 2008 buyback were held by 
the individual who sold their LEP in the buyback. The majority o f LEPs sold in the 2008 buyback 
were held for less than 10 years where years held is the number of years the LEP sold in buyback was 
held by the individual who sold it. Figure 19 presents similar information about the 2012 buyback 
LEP holding duration. The majority (68.8%) of LEPs sold in the 2012 buyback were held for more 
than 10 years.
12 Note here that while the halibut fishery is managed by NMFS RAM, IFQ fishers still require a non-lim ited CFEC halibut 
permit to land their harvest in the State o f Alaska.
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Figure 18. Frequency distribution of the number of years that 2008 buyback LEPs were held before 
buyback (CFEC, 2014).
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Years Held
Figure 19. Frequency distribution of the number of years that 2012 buyback LEPs were held before 
buyback (CFEC, 2014).
Figure 20 presents the age category of individuals who sold a LEP in the 2008 buyback. Over 74% of 
individuals in the 2008 buyback cohort were over the age o f 50. The mean age at the time o f buyback 
was 58.3 years. Figure 21 presents the age distribution of the 2012 buyback cohort. The individual 
who sold two LEPs in the 2012 buyback is represented twice in the distributional graph. Over 81% 
o f the 2012 buyback cohort was over the age of 50 at the time of buyback. The mean age in the 2012 
buyback cohort was 58.7 years.
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Figure 20. Age distribution of 2008 buyback cohort (CFEC, 2014). 
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Age Group
Figure 21. Age distribution of 2012 buyback cohort (CFEC, 2014).
It is important to know whether the LEPs bought in the buyback were actively fished or latent. I f  all 
LEPs were actively fished, the buybacks would have reduced active capacity, whereas if  all the retired 
LEPs were latent, active capacity would not have been reduced. Appendices 4 and 5 present 
information about the fishing activity of the LEPs sold in the 2008 and 2012 buybacks. The tables 
represent whether the permit was associated with a landing in ADF&G fish tickets regardless o f who
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held the LEP. An “L” denotes the LEP was latent.13 Over 80% o f the 35 LEPs sold in the 2008 
buyback were latent (not associated with landings in the five years prior to the 2008 buyback). Over 
70% of the 64 LEPs sold in the 2012 buyback were latent (not associated with landings in the five 
years prior to the 2012 buyback). This means, that for the most part, the two buyback programs 
succeeded in removing potential rather than active fishing capacity.
Additional Bid Solicitation
The authorizing regulations did not limit the use of federal loan to a one-time deal (50 CFR 
600.1107). As of this writing, the SRA still has $10.34 million available to purchase additional LEPs. 
The SRA opened up two additional rounds of bidding, one between December 28, 2012 and January 
25, 2013 and the other between April 28, 2014 and May 30, 2014. The third and fourth rounds of 
bidding did not produce any bids that met with SRA approval. Nevertheless, it is interesting to 
compare how bid amounts changed across years.
Table 4 provides summary statistics from the bids during the four rounds of bidding (Robert Kehoe, 
SRA, personal communication). The number o f bids offered decreased in each round, from a high of 
82 bidders willing to part their permits in 2008, to only 9 in the last round in 2014. The minimum bid 
offered in each round has continued to rise, from a low of $47,608 (real) in 2008, to a low of 
$319,927 (real) in the last round in 2014. The mean and median bids have likewise followed an 
upward trend. The CFEC published permit value has increased during each period of bidding. The 
average deviation ((Bid — CFEC permit value)/ # of bids) from the CFEC’s published permit value 
in the month bidding was open has likewise increased. The percent deviation is the average deviation 
from the CFEC permit value divided by the published permit value. The bids for 2008, 2012, and 
2013 are statistically significant different from LEP sales in those same years. There is not enough 
data for 2014 permit sales to test significance. Table 5 presents the results of testing the difference 
between rounds of bidding. All rounds of bidding were statistically different from each other at the 
1% level o f significance except for the 2013 and 2014 rounds of bidding.
13 An “L” in the years before 1990 may indicate either a permanent permit with no landings or a permit that the 
CFEC had not yet issued.
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Table 4. Bid comparison matrix between all four rounds of bidding, 2013 dollars (CFEC, 2014; SRA, 
2014).
2008 2012 2013 2014
Total Number o f Bids 82 74 11 9
Number o f Accepted Bids 35 64 0 0
Minimum Bid $47,608 $177,563 $265,000 $319,927
Maximum Bid $757,397 $355,127 $450,000 $442,976
Mean Bid $127,239 $216,449 $355,773 $383,147
Median Bid $103,872 $202,930 $360,000 $388,835
Standard Deviation $95,407 $28,551 $47,203 $38,465
CFEC Permit Value In Month o f Bidding $70,979 $155,038 $251,400 $306,441
Mean Deviation From CFEC Permit Value $56,261 $61,411 $104,373 $38,465
Percent Deviation From CFEC Value 79.3% 39.6% 41.5% 25%
Table 5. Statistical significance (two tail p-values) of estimated difference between mean bid price 
during four rounds of bidding.
2008 2012 2013 2014
2008 ~ <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
2012 <.0001 ~ <.0001 <.0001
2013 <.0001 <.0001 ~ 0.192
2014 <.0001 <.0001 0.192 ~
Two things are apparent. First, fewer permitees are willing to offer up their permits in each 
progressive round of bidding. Second, those that are willing to offer up their permit do so at 
progressively higher reservation prices.
Dependent Variable
Yearly real (2013 base) permit value was used as the dependent variable. Permit values were adjusted 
using the U.S. Department of Labor’s Consumer Price Index with 2013 as base. Real permit values 
are available for 1978 — 2013; 36 observations. Although, permit values are reported on a monthly 
basis, harvests are only made in the summer months. This particularity to commercial fishing data 
necessitated the use of annual data. Figure 22 presents the trend and correlation analysis output for 
annual real permit value: a time series plot of the observations, the corresponding autocorrelation 
function (ACF), partial autocorrelation function (PACF), and inverse autocorrelation function 
(IACF). The ACF and PACF graphs suggest that real annual permit prices follow an autoregressive 
AR(1) process (the ACF tails off slowly and the PACF cuts off after lag 1). The inverse 
autocorrelation function is not o f much functional use in evaluation o f these data as it is generally
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used to identify seasonal autoregressive models and the yearly real permit price is not seasonal data. 
Like Karpoff (1984) and Huppert, Ellis, and Noble (1996), the AR(1) model is part of an adaptive 
expectations model where past profit (here lag of mean real gross earnings per permit fished) and 
LEP value in the last time period will explain permit price in the current time period.
Trend and Correlation Analysis for real_pvr
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Figure 22. Trend and correlation analysis for annual mean real permit value.
Because a similar pattern of ACF and PACF values could arise from a random walk process, real 
annual mean permit prices were tested for the presence of unit roots. If annual mean permit prices 
are driven by a random walk process, their use as a dependent variable could lead to spurious 
conclusions about the influence of the explanatory variables. Testing for the presence o f unit roots 
can proceed from the assumption that these data are characterized by a random walk (or random 
walk with drift or trend) or from the assumption that these data are not characterized by a random 
walk (or random walk with drift or trend). The most popular test statistic for the former hypothesis is 
the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) while the preferred test for the latter hypothesis is the 
Kwaitkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) (Kwiatkowski et al, 1992). The choice between these 
hypotheses is not arbitrary but is instead driven by consideration of the relative likelihood that the 
observations result from the presence of deterministic trends or the presence of stochastic trends. 
Stochastic trends are characteristic of many financial time series and thus could be descriptive of 
variations in the price of LEPs. However, unlike most financial assets, salmon LEPs cannot be
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purchased for pure speculation. Instead purchases must be approved by CFEC and are subject to a 
test of intent to fish. Moreover, empirical estimates conclude that LEP prices reflect the discounted 
expected value o f net revenues which are determined by the quantity of expected salmon returns and 
expected exvessel prices (Karpoff, 1984b; Huppert et al., 1996; Newell et al., 2007). There is general 
agreement that salmon returns follow a stochastic nonlinear autoregressive process (the spawner- 
recruit relationship). Although some authors (e.g., Asche et al., 1999) have treated salmon prices as 
non-stationary time series processes, other authors (e.g., Herrmann et al., 1993; Williams et al., 2009) 
continue a tradition of representing salmon prices as the outcome o f the interplay of systems of 
structural supply and demand relationships. Table 6 presents the results of KPSS test for stationarity 
for which we fail to reject the null hypothesis, and conclude that the series is trend stationary and 
thus suitable for use as a dependent variable in a structural time series regression model.
Table 6. KPSS test results for real yearly permit price.
eypeT sgsaL Eta Prob10pr Prob5pr Prob1pr
Single Mean 3 0.127 0.347 0.463 0.739
Trend 3 0.129 0.119 0.146 0.216
Independent Variables
Table 7 presents the correlation analysis between real permit value and possible independent 
variables. These data were the data readily available within the CFEC Gross Earnings and Permit 
Files. As a first step, the correlation, or extent of linear association, between real permit value and the 
possible explanatory variables was examined. Some of these variables are highly correlated with each 
other or are factors in the product o f one of the variables, i.e., Chum pounds and Chum real exvessel 
price per pound. This initial correlation table allows a comparison of the relationship between the 
independent variable, real permit value, and possible explanatory variables. All the correlation 
coefficients show expected sign and magnitude, except for Chum pounds. Not all of these variables 
were suitable for use in model estimation; if all variables had been included, problems of 
multicollinearity would have arisen. For example, lagged total gross earning and lagged mean gross 
earnings are highly collinear. Lagged real mean gross earnings was selected for inclusion in the model 
because it had a stronger relationship to real permit value than did the lag of real total gross earnings. 
Because pounds landed and exvessel prices are used to calculate gross earnings, they could not be 
included.
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Table 7. Pearson correlation coefficient (r) table for real permit value.
Variable r Prob | p | 4  0 OBS
Binary buyback dummy 0.191 0.264 36
Chum pounds -0.186 0.279 36
Chum real gross earnings 0.290 0.086 36
Chum real exvessel price/lb. 0.279 0.010 36
Lag o f real mean gross earnings 0.696 <.001 36
Lag o f real total gross earnings 0.541 0.001 36
Pink pounds 0.109 0.526 36
Pink real gross earnings 0.527 0.001 36
Pink real exvessel price/lb. 0.311 0.064 36
Lag o f real permit price 0.861 <.001 35
Second lag o f real permit price 0.535 0.001 34
L ag  o f R e a l P erm it P rice
The lag of real permit price was used for an autoregressive model of level one. Graphical analysis of 
the ACF and PAC (Figure 15) indicate that an AR(1) model would be an appropriate time-series 
model. Following Karpoff (1984) and Huppert et al. (1996), the AR(1) model was used to represent 
an adaptive expectations framework where past profit (here lag of mean real gross earnings per 
permit fished) and LEP value in the last time period will explain permit price in the current time 
period.
B in ary B uyb ack D um m y V ariable
The binary buyback dummy variable was set equal to 0 for years before 2008 and 1 for all years after. 
Although there were two distinct rounds o f buyback, one in 2008 and 2012, there are yet not enough 
observations following the 2012 buyback to support creation o f a second distinct buyback dummy 
variable. The binary buyback dummy variable was included as part of the models to test whether the 
buyback caused a statistically significant increase in real permit value in the years when buyback 
reduced the number of LEPs.
L ag  o f R e a l M ean Gross E arn ings p er P erm it F ish ed
Mean real gross earnings per permit fished is an index of the return to fishing an S01A permit. The 
previous year’s mean gross earnings per permit fished provides a signal to other fishers of what the 
returns to fishing an LEP in the fishery might be. Although mean gross earnings does not 
incorporate any factor of the costs associated with an operation, information on costs is not 
reasonably available and therefore net real earnings cannot be calculated or used. Figure 23 provides 
trend and correlation analysis for mean real gross earnings per permit fished.
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Trend and Correlation Analysis for average_real_earnings
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Figure 23. Trend and correlation analysis for mean real gross earnings per permit fished.
Table 8 provides the KPSS test for stationarity for which we fail to reject the null hypothesis, and 
conclude that the series is trend stationary.
Table 8. KPSS test results for mean real gross earnings per permit fished.
Lags Eta Prob10pr Prob5pr Problpr
Single Mean 3 0.158 0.347 0.463 0.739
Trend 3 0.144 0.119 0.146 0.216
Models
The SAS ETS® AUTOREG procedure was used to estimate the AR (1) model of yearly permit value. 
This is in line with an adaptive expectations model where past profit (here lag of mean real gross 
earnings per permit fished) and LEP value in the last time period will explain permit price in the 
current time period (Karpoff, 1984; Huppert et al., 1996). The buyback binary variable was added to 
test whether the buyback had a statistically significant impact on LEP value. Three candidate models 
were tested in linear form, log-log form and log-level form, where PPt-1 is the lag of real permit value,
41
Dt is the dummy buyback variable, AvgRevn is the lag o f real average earnings, and ut is a white 
noise error term. All models included a lag of the dependent variable (real permit price) which may 
cause concern with problems of serial correlation and biased estimates of the model coefficients.
M odel 1: PPt = ^0 + ^ P P n  + ^2Dt + ^3 (AvgRevn) +ut
M odel 2: /n(PPt) = ^0 + P1 ln{ PPt-1) + ^2Dt + ^3 /n(AvgRevn) +ut
M odel 3: /n(PPt) = ^0 + P1 ( PPt-1) + ^D t + ^3 (AvgRevn) +ut
Table 9 presents the parameter estimates from each model. At the 10% level of significance, all 
models provide that the buyback did increase real permit values as expected by examination of the 
long-run and short-run models provided in Figures 3 and 14. The buyback coefficient in each model 
has the expected sign. That is, the estimated coefficient suggests that the buyback had a positive real 
effect on permit value.
Table 9. Coefficient estimates for Model 1 (linear), Model 2 (log-log), and Model 3 (log-linear). 
Standard errors of coefficients are included in parenthesis below the coefficient estimates. Statistical 
significance is indicated by asterisks, triple asterisk (***) indicates significance at the 1% level, (**) at 
the 5% level, and (*) at the 10% level.
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept -31,968(11,492)
-0.846
(1.381)
10.223
(0.116)
Lag o f Real Permit Price 0.857***(0.094)
0.861***
(0.095)
8.010 E-8*** 
(9.53 E-9)
Binary Buyback Dummy Variable 29,779**(10,081)
0.241**
(0.097)
0.176*
(0.102)
Lag o f Mean Real Earnings 0.204***(0.055)
0.197
(0.140)
1.680 E-8** 
(5.556 E-8)
Table 10 presents corresponding estimates of four goodness of fit statistics for each model: Akaike’s 
information criterion (AIC), the corrected Akaike’s information criterion (AlCc), Schwarz’s Bayesian 
information criterion (SBC), and the R-square. In order to provide cross-model comparisons of 
goodness of fit, the predicted values from Model 2 and Model 3 were exponentiated to calculate each 
model’s explained variance, which was then in turn used to calculate the AIC, AICc, SBC, and R- 
square values reported in Table 10. Model 2 has the highest R-square— it fits best. However, Model 1
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also fit well (R-square = 0.871) and it has lower values for AIC, AICc, and SBC. Thus it is preferred 
to Model 2. Model 3, the log-linear model, performed so poorly that it was outperformed by naive 
forecasts (a negative R-square indicates that the sum of squared errors of the model forecasts is larger 
than the sum of squared deviations of the dependent variable).
Table 10. Goodness of fit comparison between models.
Model AIC AICc SBC R-Square
Model 1 800.522 801.855 806.743 0.871
Model 2 824.711 826.011 832.487 0.881
Model 3 934.245 935.545 935.545 -1.710
Model 1 is the linear model. The lag of real permit price can be interpreted to mean that after 
controlling for buyback and last year’s mean gross earnings, each $1 increase in last year’s permit 
price can be expected to increase the current year’s permit price by $0.857. Likewise the lag of mean 
real earnings can be interpreted as each dollar increase in the previous year’s real mean gross earnings 
will increase the current year’s permit value by $0.204, holding all other variables constant. The 
binary buyback coefficient can be interpreted to mean that after controlling for all other variables, the 
buyback increased permit values by $29,779. The three independent variables have expected signs. As 
the basic supply and demand models predicted, the buyback increased permit values. Figure 24 
provides the fit diagnostics for for Model 1. The studentized residual plot does show some pattern of 
over and then underestimation consistent with serial correlation. The percent residuals graph does 
show that the residuals are fairly normally distributed. The ACF graph still shows a statistically 
significant correlation at lag 1, which means there may be some structure remaining in the time series 
o f these data for real permit price that the model does not capture.
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Observations 35 M SE 4.5099E8 Model D F 4
Figure 24. Model 1 fit diagnostics.
Model 2 is the log-log model. The logged lag of real permit value can be interpreted to mean that 
after controlling for buyback and the previous year’s mean gross earnings, a 1% increase in the 
previous year’s permit value will increase the current year’s permit value by 0.861%. Similarly, a 1% 
increase in the previous year’s real mean earnings will increase the current year’s permit value by
0.197%. The binary buyback dummy variable suggests that after controlling for increases in the 
previous year’s permit value and mean gross earnings, the buyback increased permit values by 24.1%. 
Figure 25 provides the fit diagnostics for for Model 2. The studentized residual plot does show some 
pattern of over and then underestimation consistent with serial correlation. The percent residuals 
graph does show that the residuals are fairly normally distributed. The ACF graph still shows a 
statistically significant correlation at lag 1, which means there may be some structure remaining in the 
time series of these data for real permit price that the model does not capture.
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Figure 25. Model 2 fit diagnostics.
Model 3 is the log-linear model. The lag of real permit price can be interpreted as after controlling 
for buyback and the previous year’s mean gross earnings, a 1% increase in last year’s permit value will 
increase the current year’s permit value by 0.008%. Similarly, a 1% increase in the previous year’s 
mean real earnings will increase the current year’s permit value by 0.002%. The binary buyback 
dummy variable suggests that after controlling for increases in the previous year’s permit value and 
mean gross earnings, the buyback increased permit values by 17.6%. Figure 26 provides the fit 
diagnostics for for Model 3. The studentized residual plot does show some pattern of over and then 
underestimation consistent with serial correlation. The percent residuals graph does show that the 
residuals do not exhibit the same extent o f normality as the graphs from Model 1 or Model 2. The 
ACF graph still shows a statistically significant correlation at lag 1, which means there may be some 
structure remaining in the time series of these data for real permit price that the model does not 
capture.
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Figure 26. Model 3 fit diagnostics.
4.0 Program Evaluation and Conclusion
The SRA’s buyback programs in 2008 and 2012, together retired 99 S01A LEPs. The impetus and 
momentum for buyback in the fishery was not conservation, or to address market failure, but rather 
to address policy objectives outlined by LEP holders. By 2004, nearly half of the fleet had voted with 
their feet, and either because of lack of market or low economic returns, these permitees did not fish 
their LEPs. Permitees, through the SRA wanted to permanently reduce the number of permits in the 
fishery using a buyback.
Government motivation for intervening in markets, such as the market for S01A LEPs, is that there 
may be conditions that prevent markets from achieving efficient outcomes. The most common 
sources o f market failure in the provision of environmental goods or the exploitation o f natural 
resources are: externalities, public goods, unowned and common property, market power, or 
asymmetric information (Randall, 1983). None of these are important features of the market for 
S01A permits. Information on the value of LEPs is readily available to buyers and sellers, so 
information is not asymmetric. Although the number of permits is limited by the state and will 
become more so under the buyback, the S01A fishery is only one of many salmon fisheries in Alaska 
and so the buyback is unlikely to create opportunity for S01A LEP-holders to influence the market
46
price o f salmon or of their LEPs. And finally, salmon LEPs do not have the characteristics o f public 
goods nor are there externalities in the market for LEPs.
Despite the lack of economic imperative for government intervention in the market for S01A LEPs, 
the programs can be evaluated in light of their stated goals:
1. Reduce fishing capacity by permanently revoking a substantial number o f permits.
2. Promote economic efficiency.
3. Improve flexibility in the conservation and management of the fishery.
4. Obtain the maximum reduction in permits at the least cost.
A concern in any buyback is that those remaining in the fishery will increase their fishing 
effort/capacity to meet or exceed pre-buyback effort/capacity (GAO, 2000; Grafton and Nelson, 
2005). That is, those remaining will use the increase in returns resulting from buyback to invest in 
larger vessels and/or gear that is more efficient which thwarts some purposes of buyback, namely 
capacity reduction, resource conservation and management improvements. In the case o f the S01A 
LEP fishery, Alaska Board of Fisheries and ADF&G regulations along with in-season management 
by ADF&G regulate effort in the fishery. Mangers noted that effort in 2013 increased by 42 permits 
in comparison to 2012 in their Annual Management Report. However, they attribute this increase in 
effort to high odd-year Pink Salmon forecast and return (Gray et al., 2014). The increase in fishing 
effort in number o f LEPs fished caused by the increased forecast and return could have been greater 
if  the buybacks had not removed LEPs. LEP holders may use the increase in profitability to invest in 
more efficient fishing capital.
The buyback did not change the fundamental drive of fishers to increase effort at the margins to 
temporarily gain a larger slice o f the pie, a process that increases harvest costs to all (Criddle, 2012; 
Criddle and Shimizu, 2014). The buyback programs were both successful in reducing latent fishing 
capacity but their effect is not binding because it did not prevent the fleet from harvesting the 
maximum permissible catch, it did not lead to a marked increase in season length, nor did it eliminate 
all latent capacity. As each limited entry permit confers the same access to fish within the regulatory 
constraints o f fishing in Alaska state waters, the removal of latent, inactive LEPs removed potential 
fishing capacity, but not active fishing capacity.
Economic conditions in the fishery have improved. In 2013, the fishery landed over 334 million 
pounds of salmon, the largest harvest since records have been kept. LEP values have increased from 
a low o f $29,310 (real) to a high o f $300,800 at year-end 2013. Average real earnings per permit
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fished had increased from a low of $95,329 in 2002, to $212,119 in 2008, $317,539 in 2012 and to a 
record high of $323,137 in 2013. While increases in exvessel prices and in harvests have undoubtedly 
factored into the upturn in LEP value, the removal of 99 S01A LEPs from the long-run supply of 
LEPs also contributed to the increase in LEP value. Model 1, the best performing model indicated 
that the buyback increased average real permit value by $29,779.
ADF&G area management biologists manage the Southeast salmon purse seine fishery. The AMBs 
made note of the buyback removal of LEPs in their annual management report but they did not 
confer any judgment on the effects of the buyback on management in the fishery (Gray et al., 2014). 
The year 2013 was a record forecast and harvest of Pink Salmon and it is not possible to separate the 
increase in effort caused by the record run and steady exvessel price from the increase in profitability 
caused by removal of LEPs in the buyback.
B uyb ack A dm in istration
To satisfy their goal of retiring the most LEPs for the least cost, the SRA used voluntary, reverse 
auctions to determine which bids to accept in each buyback round. The reverse auction format ranks 
bids from lowest to highest and accepts all bids up to the available funds or those within an 
acceptable bid range. Recall that the SRA did not accept all bids in the 2008 buyback round because 
they were constrained by the available grant amount. In the 2012 buyback, the SRA did not accept all 
bids because they determined some bids to be too far above fair market value. The 2008 buyback 
allowed bidders to revoke their bids after SRA acceptance; the 2012 buyback did not.
A fishery buyback can proceed in one of two general ways. The first is a “big bang” approach, where 
the buyback administrator purchases the permits (or vessels) in one round (Groves and Squires, 
2007). The second, temporally spread method, involves multiple rounds of buying and retiring 
permits and/or vessels. Although the SRA’s original plan had been to pool the federal grant money 
together with the federally backed fishery reduction loan, in praxis, the process of applying a federal 
program to a state-permit fishery took longer than expected. Consequently, the SRA chose to use 
each funding source separately; the grant money first in 2008 and the federally backed reduction loan 
in 2012.
There are distinct drawbacks and advantages of administering a buyback in multiple rounds. Groves 
and Squires (2007) offer a succinct discussion on some of the drawbacks to designing a buyback 
program with multiple rounds:
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Buybacks conducted in stages also offer a number of disadvantages. Prices may 
increase as multiple rounds progress. With the removal of a license or vessel, supply 
falls and the remaining licenses increase in value, partly because fewer vessels or 
licenses remain, and also partly because of any gains in economic rents that are 
capitalized into the vessel or license price. In addition, with multiple rounds, there 
can be a strategic behavior in which the sellers know that they can submit bids in 
later round and may try to increase their bids by delaying (i.e., there is an option, 
which can be factored into the price). Vessel and license buyback prices may also 
end up inadvertently serving as a price floor in the secondhand vessel or license 
market. ... Multiple rounds can also raise administrative costs (Groves and Squires,
2007).
Likewise, Groves and Squires (2007) summarize some of the advantages of multiple round of 
bidding:
Buybacks conducted in stages offer several advantages: revealed common 
information allows gauging of the bid market and beneficial learning, adjusted 
payments target particular groups of fishers or desired vessel numbers or capacity 
level, the criteria for accepting bids can be adjusted, and fishers have the chance to 
reformulate their bids as they better understand the buyback market and buyback 
program. Multiple rounds of bidding also help dampen the frequency o f “stink 
bids” (i.e., those bids than aim to obtain a payment exceeding the amount the bidder 
thought the government would purchase) (Groves and Squires, 2007).
It is possible that a “big bang” buyback, whereby the SRA would have used both the federal grant 
money and loan money at the same time for a one-shot buyback auction, may have been a more 
efficient and economical way of administering the buyback programs, versus the temporally spread 
administration of multiple bidding rounds.
On the other hand, the multiple rounds of bidding could be seen as beneficial in that it slowed the 
removal of LEPs from the fishery. Without an optimum number or range established by the CFEC, 
there is the potential risk that the buyback could reduce the size of the fleet to such an extent that it 
is deemed too exclusive. The slower pace allows the market forces prevailing at the time of each 
round to dictate the ultimate extent of LEPs bought and retired. As an example, rounds three and 
four did not result in any accepted bids and ultimately only 99 S01A permits were retired and 315 
permanent, transferable LEPs remain in the fishery. At the present, those numbers appear to be 
socially acceptable, in that; there have been no formal legal claims that the fishery has become too 
exclusive. In 2013, there were still 39 latent permits. The existence of these latent permits, in a record 
setting year, suggests that the buyback did not remove all latent capacity and is not constraining the 
fishery. It remains conjecture whether a big bang approach, albeit efficient, would have produced a 
similar, socially acceptable outcome.
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E ffort Sp illover
A concern about buybacks in general is that the effort purchased and retired will spill over into other 
fisheries. Examination o f 2013 year-end permit holdings does not show a marked transfer of permit 
holdings from the Southeast salmon seine fisheries to other fisheries. It appears, that many of the 
individuals who sold LEPs in the buybacks, used the opportunity to retire from commercial fishing 
in Alaska as 68.5% and 55.6% o f the first and second buyback cohorts respectively held no permits 
at year-end 2013 even though there were no conditions set on future participation in the fishery. Six 
out of the 35 individuals who sold LEPs in the 2008 round held a S01A permit after the buyback was 
completed. Similarly, five out of the 63 individuals who sold LEPs in the 2012 round held S01A 
LEPs after the buyback was completed.
C ost B urden o f B uyback
The SRA used both federal grant money and a federally backed loan to retire permits. Both programs 
were voluntary, but only the 2012 buyback required majority consent from the fleet. The cost burden 
o f retiring the permits fell partly on the U.S. taxpayer, and partly on the remaining permitees in the 
S01A fishery. This is a cost burden that permitees formally accepted by referendum and taxpayers 
accepted informally through the votes of their congressional representatives. Implicit in the permit 
holder vote was a belief that the benefits of financing the permit buyback to retire the 64 permits 
would exceed the costs at overall and individual levels. Permitees had to decide whether removing 64 
additional permits from their fishery, many of them latent, was worth financing a $13.1 million dollar 
loan over a forty-year period. The exvessel tax to repay the loan is an ad valorem tax, that is, in 
proportion to the value of the fishery: everyone, large or small, pays an equal percent of their 
revenues. Thus, highliners pay more towards repayment of the loan. However, because the tax rate is 
structured to repay the loan over a fixed time, there is a regressive character to the taxation—when 
earnings in the fishery are low, the tax rate rises to the maximum 3% to meet loan service 
requirements while the tax rate falls when earnings are high because under those conditions a lower 
tax rate is sufficient to service the loan.
L e g a l Im p lication s
There is not an established optimum range of permits for the S01A fishery. The SRA never requested 
that the CFEC conduct an optimum number study in the fishery. An optimum number study can 
take many years, years that the SRA wanted to avoid. There was an inherent optimism that a buyback 
was always just around the corner. In practice, securing the federal reduction loan took far longer 
than expected. Should an individual or group make a legal challenge over the exclusivity of the
50
fishery, the CFEC would need to conduct an optimum number study to examine the fishery’s status 
and there is a potential that the CFEC would have to issue more LEPs into the fishery.
M oving Forw ard
Many of the ramifications and the final appraisal of the effectiveness of the buyback of permanent 
LEPs in the Southeast Alaska salmon purse seine fishery will have to wait until the loan that is 
financing the buyback has been paid in full, some 39 years down the road. By then, there can be a 
final accounting of whether the cost burden borne by the post buyback fishery exceeded or equaled 
the benefits derived from the removal of the LEPS through the buyback. The very simple models 
presented in this analysis showed that the buybacks did contribute to the increase in real LEP value. 
Future research on this subject would benefit from looking at different exogenous variables, such as 
a proxy for operational costs or engine horsepower or an interaction variable between buyback and 
real mean earnings per permit fished. The auction methods and design used in the multiple rounds of 
bidding would benefit from additional research. Evaluation of the strategic behavior and auction 
strategies of the auction participants is another area that would benefit from additional research.
Alaska is a unique legal environment where LEP management and the limitation of access that is 
inherent within this system must be balanced with the constitutional constraints that require LEP 
management to, “impinge as little as possible on the open fishery clauses” of the Alaska Constitution 
(Johns v. State). Time will show whether the buyback absent the optimum number determination 
made by the CFEC will stand any legal challenges, should they arise. In the short-term in light of the 
program’s stated goals, the buyback was a qualified success in increasing the asset value o f S01A 
permits and removing latent fishing capacity from returning to the fishery as exvessel prices and 
harvests increased. The larger programmatic and institutional issue that faces Alaska’s salmon 
fisheries remains, that the pernicious drive to invest caused by the race for fish remains present as 
well as competition from farmed salmon (Criddle, 2012; Criddle and Shimizu, 2014). The current 
North Pacific Ocean regime is one that by in large supports Pink and Chum Salmon abundance 
(Hare and Francis, 1995; Ruggerone et al., 2010). However, the cyclic nature o f salmon abundance 
related to ocean regime changes independent of decreases in abundance caused by inland habitat 
degradation may reverse and cause decreases in abundance similar to that seen in the late 1940s and 
1970s (Hare and Francis, 1995; Ruggerone et al., 2010). Whether LEP management and effort 
regulation through the Board of Fisheries and ADF&G management will be sufficient to meet any 
future economic and or biological capacity challenges remains to be seen.
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Appendix 1. S01A permit renewal, fishing activity, total and mean estimated gross earnings, and total and 
mean harvest (CFEC, 2014)
Year Permits Renewed Fishing Activity Estimated Gross Earnings Harvest
Interim
Entry
Permanent Total Permits
Fished
People with 
Landings
New
Entrants
Latency
Rate
Real Total Mean Real per 
Permit Fished
Total Net Pounds Mean Net 
Pounds per 
Permit Fished
1975 77 398 475 287 293 293 39.6% $25,489,672 $88,814 17,509,020 61,007
1976 9 409 418 280 281 47 33.0% $44,460,939 $158,789 25,883,556 92,441
1977 3 411 414 325 326 51 21.5% $92,356,924 $284,175 63,851,805 196,467
1978 7 413 420 376 379 61 10.5% $95,664,265 $254,426 68,404,065 181,926
1979 5 413 418 319 319 25 23.7% $60,287,087 $188,988 42,544,063 133,367
1980 3 414 417 335 336 32 19.7% $80,382,869 $239,949 62,202,123 185,678
1981 4 414 418 364 364 33 12.9% $91,502,203 $251,380 79,086,530 217,271
1982 7 414 421 370 373 26 12.1% $66,942,577 $180,926 87,175,608 235,610
1983 5 416 421 337 341 22 20.0% $76,673,929 $227,519 118,972,749 353,035
1984 5 417 422 383 386 40 9.2% $77,468,475 $202,268 104,330,035 272,402
1985 4 416 420 368 370 32 12.4% $111,229,366 $302,254 173,906,154 472,571
1986 4 416 420 368 370 17 12.4% $113,776,970 $309,177 171,047,122 464,802
1987 4 416 420 381 384 26 9.3% $45,926,164 $120,541 39,084,124 102,583
1988 4 416 420 394 399 28 6.2% $103,291,171 $262,160 48,902,193 124,117
1989 4 416 420 365 369 28 13.1% $168,907,567 $462,760 198,783,697 544,613
1990 3 417 420 360 367 23 14.3% $78,075,508 $216,876 106,726,738 296,463
1991 3 417 420 383 388 31 8.8% $61,009,117 $159,293 183,301,397 478,594
1992 3 417 420 354 356 16 15.7% $83,797,960 $236,717 134,066,977 378,720
1993 2 417 419 382 392 36 8.8% $84,554,360 $221,346 203,684,672 533,206
1994 1 417 418 390 398 37 6.7% $95,227,551 $244,173 217,313,218 557,213
1995 1 417 418 373 379 20 10.8% $84,679,934 $227,024 197,982,775 530,785
1996 1 416 417 357 362 25 14.4% $62,915,977 $176,235 278,605,327 780,407
1997 1 415 416 351 355 24 15.6% $58,900,789 $167,809 157,562,074 448,895
1998 1 415 416 377 382 34 9.4% $64,676,287 $171,555 221,502,553 587,540
1999 1 415 416 359 364 18 13.7% $78,108,012 $217,571 295,817,146 824,003
2000 1 415 416 356 360 32 14.4% $50,952,235 $143,124 141,311,987 396,944
2001 1 414 415 345 349 27 16.9% $64,038,533 $185,619 251,106,570 727,845
2002 1 414 415 273 275 7 34.2% $26,024,757 $95,329 171,261,409 627,331
2003 1 415 416 235 238 8 43.5% $33,735,935 $143,557 212,125,504 902,662
2004 0 414 414 209 210 3 49.5% $38,648,517 $184,921 207,074,131 990,785
2005 0 415 415 232 233 14 44.1% $42,548,833 $183,400 226,686,936 977,099
2006 0 414 414 230 230 6 44.4% $31,850,097 $138,479 96,044,907 417,587
2007 0 415 415 237 238 9 42.9% $55,053,385 $232,293 185,241,396 781,609
2008 0 380 380 212 214 12 44.2% $44,969,166 $212,119 81,369,600 383,819
2009 0 379 379 256 259 17 32.5% $52,163,775 $203,765 139,042,512 543,135
2010 0 379 379 235 237 14 38.0% $59,904,836 $254,914 112,463,547 478,568
2011 0 379 379 269 270 27 29.0% $125,870,532 $467,920 231,270,312 859,741
2012 0 315 315 233 238 10 26.0% $73,986,471 $317,539 114,078,774 489,608
2013* 0 315 315 277 281 25 12.1% $144,909,071 $523,137 334,349,151 1,207,037
*2013 gross earnings are calculated using preliminary exvessel price estimates which do not include any post-season adjustment payments paid to fishers.
56
Appendix 2. 2008 Cohort Year-end S01A Permit Holdings, 1975 -  2013 (CFEC, 2014)
Name
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013 Total
Permit Holder 1 <1
Permit Holder 2 <1
Permit Holder 3 X 1
Permit Holder 4 X 1
Permit Holder 5 X 1
Permit Holder 6 X X 2
Permit Holder 7 X X 2
Permit Holder 8 X X X 3
Permit Holder 9 X X X 3
Permit Holder 10 X X X X 4
Permit Holder 11 X X X X 4
Permit Holder 12 X X X X X 5
Permit Holder 13 X X X X X X 6
Permit Holder 14 X X X X X X 6
Permit Holder 15 X X X X X X 6
Permit Holder 16 X X X X X X X 7
Permit Holder 17 X X X X X X X 7
Permit Holder 18 X X X X X X X X 8
Permit Holder 19 X X X X X X X X 8
Permit Holder 20 X X X X X X X X X 9
Permit Holder 21 X X X X X X X X X X 10
Permit Holder 22 X X X X X X X X X X X X 12
Permit Holder 23 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 16
Permit Holder 24 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 20
Permit Holder 25 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 22
Permit Holder 26 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 23
Permit Holder 27 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 28
Permit Holder 28 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 29
Permit Holder 29 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 33
Permit Holder 30 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 33
Permit Holder 31 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 33
Permit Holder 32 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 33
Permit Holder 33 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 35
Permit Holder 34 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 37
Permit Holder 35 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 38
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Appendix 3. 2012 Cohort Year-end S01A Permit Holdings, 1975 -  2013 (CFEC, 2014)
Name
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013 Total
Permit Holder 1 X 1
Permit Holder 2 X 1
Permit Holder 3 X 1
Permit Holder 4 X 1
Permit Holder 5 X X 2
Permit Holder 6 X X 2
Permit Holder 7 X X 2
Permit Holder 8 X X X 3
Permit Holder 9 X X X 3
Permit Holder 10 X X X X 4
Permit Holder 11 X X X X X 5
Permit Holder 12 X X X X X 5
Permit Holder 13 X X X X X X X 7
Permit Holder 14 X X X X X X X X 8
Permit Holder 15 X X X X X X X X 8
Permit Holder 16 X X X X X X X X X X 10
Permit Holder 17 X X X X X X X X X X 10
Permit Holder 18 X X X X X X X X X X 10
Permit Holder 19 X X X X X X X X X X X 11
Permit Holder 20 X X X X X X X X X X X 11
Permit Holder 21 X X X X X X X X X X X X 12
Permit Holder 22 X X X X X X X X X X X X 12
Permit Holder 23 X X X X X X X X X X X X 12
Permit Holder 24 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 14
Permit Holder 25 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 15
Permit Holder 26 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 15
Permit Holder 27 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 15
Permit Holder 28 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 17
Permit Holder 29 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 17
Permit Holder 30 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 18
Permit Holder 31 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 18
Permit Holder 32 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 18
Permit Holder 33 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 18
Permit Holder 34 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 19
Permit Holder 35 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 20
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N am e
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013 T o ta l
Permit Holder 36 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 21
Permit Holder 37 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 21
Permit Holder 38 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 21
Permit Holder 39 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 22
Permit Holder 40 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 23
Permit Holder 41 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 23
Permit Holder 42 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 24
Permit Holder 43 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 25
Permit Holder 44 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 25
Permit Holder 45 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 26
Permit Holder 46 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 27
Permit Holder 47 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 28
Permit Holder 48 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 28
Permit Holder 49 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 30
Permit Holder 50 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 30
Permit Holder 51 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 32
Permit Holder 52 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 33
Permit Holder 53 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 34
Permit Holder 54 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 35
Permit Holder 55 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 36
Permit Holder 56 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 36
Permit Holder 57 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 37
Permit Holder 58 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 37
Permit Holder 59 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 37
Permit Holder 60 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 37
Permit Holder 61 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 37
Permit Holder 62 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 37
Permit Holder 63 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 38
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Appendix 4. Permit Latency of the 35 S01A Permits Retired in the 2008 Buyback (CFEC, 2014)
Permit
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Years
With
Landings
Years
Without
Landings
Permit 1 L L 31 2
Permit 2 L L 31 2
Permit 3 L L L L 29 3
Permit 4 L L L 30 3
Permit 5 L L L L L L 27 4
Permit 6 L L L L 29 4
Permit 7 L L L L L 28 5
Permit 8 L L L L L 28 5
Permit 9 L L L L L 28 5
Permit 10 L L L L L 28 5
Permit 11 L L L L L L 27 5
Permit 12 L L L L L L L L 25 7
Permit 13 L L L L L L L 26 7
Permit 14 L L L L L L L 26 7
Permit 15 L L L L L L L L 25 7
Permit 16 L L L L L L L L 25 8
Permit 17 L L L L L L L L 25 8
Permit 18 L L L L L L L L L 24 8
Permit 19 L L L L L L L L L 24 9
Permit 20 L L L L L L L L L L 23 9
Permit 21 L L L L L L L L L 24 9
Permit 22 L L L L L L L L L L L 22 9
Permit 23 L L L L L L L L L L 23 9
Permit 24 L L L L L L L L L L 23 10
Permit 25 L L L L L L L L L L L 22 11
Permit 26 L L L L L L L L L L L L L 20 11
Permit 27 L L L L L L L L L L L L 21 11
Permit 28 L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 19 12
Permit 29 L L L L L L L L L L L L 21 12
Permit 30 L L L L L L L L L L L L L 20 12
Permit 31 L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 12 18
Permit 32 L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 13 19
Permit 33 L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 13 19
Permit 34 L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 13 19
Permit 35 L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 5 25
Total Not 
Fished in
Year
11 9 6 4 8 7 2 4 5 1 5 5 4 2 7 8 5 8 4 3 4 8 11 7 9 11 15 22 29 30 31 31 29
Percent 31% 26% 17% 11% 23% 20% 6% 11% 14% 3% 14% 14% 11% 6% 20% 23% 14% 23% 11% 9% 11% 23% 31% 20% 26% 31% 43% 63% 83% 86% 89% 89% 83%
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Appendix 5. Permit Latency of the 64 S01A Permits Retired in the 2012 Buyback (CFEC, 2014)
Permit
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Years
with
Landings
Years
Without
Landings
Permit 1 37 0
Permit 2 L 36 1
Permit 3 L L 35 2
Permit 4 L L 35 2
Permit 5 L L 35 2
Permit 6 L L L 34 3
Permit 7 L L L 34 3
Permit 8 L L L L 33 4
Permit 9 L L L L L 32 5
Permit 10 L L L L L 32 5
Permit 11 L L L L L 32 5
Permit 12 L L L L L L 31 6
Permit 13 L L L L L L 31 6
Permit 14 L L L L L L L 30 7
Permit 15 L L L L L L L 30 7
Permit 16 L L L L L L L L 29 8
Permit 17 L L L L L L L L 29 8
Permit 18 L L L L L L L L 29 8
Permit 19 L L L L L L L L 29 8
Permit 20 L L L L L L L L 29 8
Permit 21 L L L L L L L L 29 8
Permit 22 L L L L L L L L 29 8
Permit 23 L L L L L L L L L 28 9
Permit 24 L L L L L L L L L 28 9
Permit 25 L L L L L L L L L 28 9
Permit 26 L L L L L L L L L 28 9
Permit 27 L L L L L L L L L 28 9
Permit 28 L L L L L L L L L 28 9
Permit 29 L L L L L L L L L 28 9
Permit 30 L L L L L L L L L L 27 10
Permit 31 L L L L L L L L L L 27 10
Permit 32 L L L L L L L L L L 27 10
Permit 33 L L L L L L L L L L 27 10
Permit 34 L L L L L L L L L L 27 10
Permit 35 L L L L L L L L L L 27 10
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Permit
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Years
with
Landings
Years
Without
Landings
Permit 36 L L L L L L L L L L L 26 11
Permit 37 L L L L L L L L L L L 26 11
Permit 38 L L L L L L L L L L L 26 11
Permit 39 L L L L L L L L L L L L 25 12
Permit 40 L L L L L L L L L L L L 25 12
Permit 41 L L L L L L L L L L L L 25 12
Permit 42 L L L L L L L L L L L L 25 12
Permit 43 L L L L L L L L L L L L 25 12
Permit 44 L L L L L L L L L L L L L 24 13
Permit 45 L L L L L L L L L L L L L 24 13
Permit 46 L L L L L L L L L L L L L 24 13
Permit 47 L L L L L L L L L L L L L 24 13
Permit 48 L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 23 14
Permit 49 L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 23 14
Permit 50 L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 23 14
Permit 51 L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 22 15
Permit 52 L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 22 15
Permit 53 L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 21 16
Permit 54 L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 21 16
Permit 55 L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 20 17
Permit 56 L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 19 18
Permit 57 L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 18 19
Permit 58 L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 17 20
Permit 59 L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 16 21
Permit 60 L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 14 23
Permit 61 L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 14 23
Permit 62 L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 12 25
Permit 63 L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 12 25
Permit 64 L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 9 28
Total not 
Fished
19 19 10 3 11 10 7 5 7 4 6 7 5 6 12 9 6 11 7 5 7 10 13 8 14 15 14 36 39 46 44 46 49 53 46 51 45
Percent 30% 30% 16% 5% 17% 16% 11% 8% 11% 6% 9% 11% 8% 9% 19% 14% 9% 17% 11% 8% 11% 16% 20% 13% 22% 23% 22% 56% 61% 72% 69% 72% 77% 83% 72% 80% 70%
